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TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE REFORM OF AMERICA'S
EMERGENCY LAW REGIME
Patrick A. Thronson*
Unbenownst to most Americans, the United States is presently under thirty
presidentially declared states of emergency. They confer vast powers on the Executive
Branch, including the ability to financially incapacitate any person or organiza-
tion in the United States, seize control of the nation's communications infrastruc-
ture, mobilize military forces, expand the permissible size of the military without
congressional authorization, and extend tours of duty without consent from service
personnel. Declared states of emergency may also activate Presidential Emergency
Action Documents and other continuity-of-government procedures, which confer
powers on the President-such as the unilateral suspension of habeas corpus-that
appear fundamentally opposed to the American constitutional order. Although the
National Emergencies Act, by its plain language, requires Congress to vote every six
months on whether a declared national emergency should continue, Congress has
done so only once in the nearly forty-year history of the Act.
This Note and an accompanying online compendium attempt, for the first time
since the 1970s, to reach a reasonably complete assessment of the scope and legal
effects of the thirty national emergencies now in effect in the United States. The
Note also proposes specific statutory reforms to rein in the unchecked growth of these
emergencies and political reforms to subject the vast executive powers granted by the
U.S. emergency law regime to the democratic process.
"[The Founders] knew what emergencies were, knew the pres-
sures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how
they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also sus-
pect that they suspected that emergency powers would tend to
kindle emergencies."
-Justice Robert Jackson
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer'
* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, University of Michigan Law School; A.B., Harvard
University, magna cum laude, 2005. Many thanks to ProfessorJulian Mortenson for his insights
and invaluable feedback; to Professor Leonard Niehoff for his initial guidance; to Nani
Gilkerson, Joanna Lampe, and Nina Ruvinsky for their excellent editorial assistance and
helpful suggestions; and to Katie DiSalvo and my parents for their incredible support. Any
errors are mine.
1. 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952).
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INTRODUCTION
"A national emergency exists by reason of the terrorist attacks at
the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon,
and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on the
United States," President George W. Bush proclaimed on Septem-
ber 14, 2001.2 "I hereby declare that the national emergency has
existed since September 11, 2001." 3 Over a decade later, with
Osama bin Laden dead and the infrastructure of al Qaeda "taken
apart,"4 this same emergency, and the vast powers it bestows, is still
with us-along with twenty-nine other national emergencies that
grant the President greatly enhanced powers to regulate the na-
tion's economic, military, and foreign affairs. 5 Although Congress
has been required by statute, for nearly forty years, to vote every six
months on whether a national emergency should continue, it has
done so only once.
6
The current proliferation of national emergencies is exactly what
the National Emergencies Act (NEA) was enacted to prevent. 7 The
NEA has failed entirely in this regard. The story of its failure is a
story of how the United States Congress achieved a moment of clar-
ity about the vast emergency powers it had been delegating to the
President for decades and the quantity and scope of unchecked
emergency powers then in effect.8 It is a story of how Congress, with
substantial support and cooperation from the Executive Branch,9
constructed a framework intended to comprehensively regulate and
limit future declarations of national emergency.'0 And it is a story of
2. See Proclamation No. 7463, 3 C.F.R. 263 (2002), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CFR-2002-title3-voll/pdf/CFR-2002-title3-voll-proc7463.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Fawn Johnson & Alexandrajaffe, Brennan: "We're on the Path to al-Qaida's Destruction,"
NAT'L J. (Apr. 29, 2012, 2:21 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecuity/
brennan-we-re-on-the-path-to-al-qaida-s-destruction-20120429.
5. See infra Parts III-IV.
6. See infta Part II.
7. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255-58 (1976) (codified at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2006)); see also infra Part Il.
8. See, e.g., 121 CONG. REc. S2302 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1975) (statement of Sen. Charles
Mathias), reprinted in S. COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS & THE SPECIAL COMM. ON NAT'L EMER-
GENCIES AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE NATIONAL EMERGEN-
Ciws AcT SOURCE Boovu LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS, at 285 (1976)
[hereinafter S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS] ("The Committee concluded that not one, but
four national emergencies exist and continue to this day. Moreover, we discovered that emer-
gency powers exist in more than 470 separate statutes and, when combined, give the Presi-
dent potential dictatorial powers.").
9. See S. RP. No. 93-1170, at 4 (1974), reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS,
supra note 8, at 22.
10. See S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 291.
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how Congress, enabled by the judiciary, subsequently rendered its
own work superfluous by consigning the NEA's safeguards against
the abuse of emergency powers to a state of disuse and
irrelevance. " I
In the 1970s, senators and representatives across the political
spectrum responded vigorously to a Senate committee finding that
the United States had been operating for over forty years under
four presidentially declared states of emergency that gave rise to
vast emergency powers. 12 The existence of these emergencies made
it "distressingly clear" to that committee "that our Constitutional
11. See Bruce Ackerman, TheEmergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1080 (2004). The
NEA specifies that "[n]ot later than six months after a national emergency is declared, and
not later than the end of each six-month period thereafter that such emergency continues,
each House of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a joint resolution to determine
whether that emergency shall be terminated." 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b) (2006). Congress has
never complied with the plain language of this section, however, as no such vote has ever
occurred. Ackerman, supra, at 1080 (quoting Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of
Liberalism, 98 YALE LJ. 1385, 1417 (1989)). Furthermore, "despite the mandatory force of the
word 'shall,' courts have found 'no legal remedy for a congressional failure to comply with
the statute.' " Id.
Courts and commentators have claimed that a present-day Congress may not bind a fu-
ture one. See, e.g., U.S. v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) ("'Acts of parliament
derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not.... [T]he legislature, being
in truth the sovereign power ... acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior
legislature must have been, if it's [sic] ordinances could bind the present parliament.' ")
(quoting Blackstone) (alteration in original). Although this principle, of course, supports the
proposition that a Congress may undo a law passed by a prior Congress, it does not mean that
Congress is exempt from the operation of duly enacted, effective laws, such as 50 U.S.C.
§ 1622(b). Numerous Congresses have passed laws imposing obligations on Congress that
would make little sense if they were not treated as legal obligations by future Congresses. See,
e.g., Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, P.L. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at
2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438 (2006)) (imposing existing statutes pertaining to employment dis-
crimination, workplace safety, and other matters on Congress); see also Thomas Jefferson, A
MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARV PRACTICE: FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES (2d
ed. 1812), inJEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS 359 (Wilbur S. Howell ed., 1988), quoted in
Harold H. Bruff, That the Laws Shall Bind Equally on All: Congressional and Executive Roles in
Applying Laws to Congress, 48 ARK. L. REV. 105, 105 (1995) ("It was probably from [their] view
of the encroaching character of privilege, that the framers of our constitution, in their care
to provide that the laws shall bind equally on all, and especially that those who make them
shall not exempt themselves from their operation, have only privileged 'Senators and Repre-
sentatives' themselves from ... 'being questioned in any other place for any speech or debate
in either House.' ") (alteration in original). Congress's legal obligations include require-
ments to regularly perform certain legislative acts. See, e.g., 14 U.S.C. § 661 (2006) ("For each
fiscal year, Congress shall authorize the strength for active duty personnel of the Coast Guard
as of the end of that fiscal year."); 40 U.S.C. § 18104 (2006) ("Each House of Congress shall
establish a policy under which Members of the House of Representatives and the Senate may
obtain TTY's for use in communicating with hearing-impaired and speech-impaired
individuals .... .").
12. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 93-1170, supra note 9, at 1.
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government has been weakened by 41 consecutive years of emer-
gency rule." 13 Today, elected representatives and the national politi-
cal discourse appear oblivious to the ongoing operation of thirty
presidentially declared states of national emergency.14 In short, the
very mechanism the Congress enacted-with "exemplary" coopera-
tion from the Executive Branch' 5-to prevent numerous or indefi-
nite declarations of national emergency has become part and
parcel of their unmitigated propagation. 16
This Note and an accompanying online compendium 7 attempt,
for the first time since the 1970s, to provide a reasonably complete
assessment of the scope and legal effects of the thirty national emer-
gencies now in effect in the United States. This Note also proposes
specific statutory reforms to halt the unchecked growth of these
emergencies, and political reforms that would subject the vast exec-
utive powers granted by the U.S. emergency law regime to the dem-
ocratic process.
Part I outlines the methodology that this Note employs in assess-
ing the scope and domestic effects of national emergencies. Part II
analyzes the legislative history and text of the NEA. Part III details
some of the most notable domestic emergency powers triggered by
a declaration of national emergency, including those that allow the
Executive Branch to completely freeze the assets of those merely
suspected of terrorism, suspend minimum wage requirements in
public contracts, and seize control of U.S. communications infra-
structure. It also reviews publicly available, yet hardly publicized,
information on highly classified continuity-of-government proce-
dures and Presidential Emergency Action Documents (PEADs),
some of which appear contrary to fundamental constitutional
principles.
Part IV focuses on the implications of national emergencies for
foreign affairs, particularly the central role of the national emer-
gency declared after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
(9/11) as an independent basis of authority for mobilizing military
forces, expanding the permissible size of the military, and ex-
tending tours of duty without consent from service personnel.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part III, Table 1.
15. See S. REP. No. 93-1170, supra note 9.
16. For a discussion of one theory of the political dynamic underlying this process, by
which mechanisms of review instituted by one Congress fall into lassitude because of a lack of
political will on the part of later Congresses, see Epic POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE
UNBOUND 55, 85--89 (2010).
17. See PATRICK THRONSON, COMPILATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS, U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM (2013), available at http://www.mjlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/National_
Emergency-Powers.pdf.
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Part V proposes reforms to restore congressional oversight and
democratic accountability, including a model statute.
I. METHODOLOGY
This Note catalogues statutory provisions and presidential orders
containing powers that are explicitly activated by a presidential dec-
laration of national emergency, analyzes the most far-reaching of
these powers, and proposes reforms. The accompanying online
compendium of emergency powers provides a full description of
my methodology.18
This Note draws on a variety of primary sources, primarily stat-
utes, presidential orders, and other government documents.
Federal law provides for presidential declarations of emergency
that are analogous to a "national emergency" but are classified dif-
ferently and trigger authorities beyond those activated by a declara-
tion of national emergency. These additional types of emergencies
include "national security emergency," "catastrophic emergency,"
"defense emergency," "air defense emergency," and "civil emer-
gency."' 9 The powers triggered by declaring any of these emergen-
cies are considered in the analysis presented below, the online
companion, or both.
Emergency powers that are activated by a declaration of national
emergency derive from both statutes and presidential orders. These
orders can take a wide range of forms, including Executive Orders,
Proclamations, and Presidential Directives.20 Although presidents
have called presidential directives by different names since Harry
Truman issued the first such directive 2' in 1947,22 they take three
18. See id.
19. A "national emergency" is the only type of emergency that the NEA mentions. See
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2006). However, the legislative history of
the NEA indicates that it was intended to regulate any declaration of national emergency,
however denoted. See S. REP. No. 93-1170, supra note 9, at 11.
20. See HARoLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-611 GOV, PRESIDENTIAL DiREc-
T1VES: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 3-8 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
98-611.pdf. These other forms include presidential announcements, licenses, certificates,
interpretations, findings, regulations, memoranda, directives, authorizations, letters,
administrative orders, designations, reorganization plans, and military orders. Id. The
Executive Branch has maintained that there is no difference in legal effectiveness between
these various forms of communicating a presidential order. See Legal Effectiveness of a
Presidential Directive, as Compared to an Executive Order, 24 Op. O.L.C. 29 (2000), availa-
ble at http://wwwjustice.gov/olc/predirective.htm [hereinafter Legal Effectiveness of a Presi-
dential Directive].
21. See RELYEA, supra note 20, at 3-8.
22. See National Security Council [NSC] Truman Administration [194 7-1953], FED'N OF AM.
SCIENTIsTs, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2012).
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main forms: study directives, which instruct the National Security
Council or other government agencies to provide information to
the President on a given subject;23 decision directives, which con-
tain orders and policy determinations; 4 and homeland security
presidential directives, which "record and communicate presiden-
tial decisions about the homeland security policies of the United
States."2 5 The full text and even the titles of many directives are
secret.26 Despite this secrecy, the Executive Branch has maintained
that such directives retain the full force and effect of law.
27
My findings are incomplete for two unavoidable reasons: many
directives are still classified, 28 and those that are publicly available
likely represent only a small portion of the presidential orders
deemed sensitive by the federal government. The number of such
directives is dramatically lower in more recent administrations, par-
ticularly those of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, than under
previous presidents. 29 As the National Security Archive has ob-
served, this suggests that important presidential orders have been
communicated through documents or channels that are obscured
from the public.30
My analysis concludes that a declaration of national emergency
makes available to the President powers contained in at least 160
23. See, e.g., Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 4,
2011), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/psd/psd-IO.html.
24. See, e.g., Presidential Policy Directive 8, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURJTY (March 30, 2011),
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc-1215444247124.shtm.
25. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-1: Organization and Operation
of the Homeland Security Council, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1568 (Oct. 29, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-l.htm.
26. See, e.g., Presidential Policy Directives, FED'N OF Am. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/ppd/index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).
27. See Legal Effectiveness of a Presidential Directive, supra note 20.
28. See, e.g., National Security Presidential Directives [NSPD] George W. Bush Administration,
FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/index.html (last visited Oct.
21, 2012); Presidential Policy Directives [PPDs] Barack Obama Administration, FED'N OF AM. SCIEN-
TISTS, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/index.html (last visited, Oct. 21, 2012).
29. Compare e.g., NSDD-National Security Decision Directives-Reagan Administration, FED'N
OF AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html (last visited Dec. 26,
2012) (325 decision directives), with National Security Presidential Directives [NSPD] George W.
Bush Administration, FED'N OF AM. SCIENrisrS, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/index.
html (last visited Dec. 26, 2012) (91 decision directives), and Presidential Policy Directives [PPDs]
Barack Obama Administration, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/
index.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2012) (20 decision directives).
30. Cf Presidential Directives on National Security, Part II: From Harry Truman to George W
Bush (Presidential Directives, Part II), DIGITAL NAT'L SEcURTY ARCHIVE, http://nsarchive.chad
wyck.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/collections/content/PR/intro.jsp (last visited Nov. 1, 2012)
("[M]any of the issues dealt with ... through decision directives were handled in subsequent
administrations through memoranda that did not fall within the series reproduced in this
collection.").
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provisions of statutory law and dozens of Executive Orders, presi-
dential directives, and other regulations. 3l The sections that follow
analyze some of the provisions with the most far-reaching effects on
the individual liberties and livelihoods of United States residents
and on the country's international relations.
II. LEGISLATrVE HISTORY
This Part examines the legislative history of the NEA and the text
of the Act. It seeks in part to ascertain the legislative intent of
Congress-as expressed in revisions to the legislation, committee
reports, and floor debates-with respect to the Act, and examine
whether that intent was betrayed. Understanding this essential his-
tory is indispensable to meaningful reform.
A. Origins of the Act
"To understand the full significance of the National Emergencies
Act," Senators Frank Mathias (R-MD) and Frank Church (D-ID)
wrote in the introduction to a 1976 legislative history sourcebook of
the NEA, "one must place it within the context of Congressional
efforts to reclaim prerogatives abandoned to the Executive." 32 Sena-
tors Church and Mathias had in mind Vietnam- and Watergate-era
congressional reforms that represented an "historic redemption of
jurisdiction by the Congress '33 and included passage of the War
Powers Resolution, inquiries into the conduct of intelligence agen-
cies, and the rejection of weapons-development initiatives.
3 4
Senator Mathias, a Republican, provided the initial impetus for
the NEA.3 5 "My own interest in the question of emergency powers,"
Mathias testified before a House committee, "developed out of our
experience in the Vietnam War and the incursion into Cambodia.
It became clear that the President had powers to commit us to war-
fare without adequate respect for the constitutional requirement
31. See THRONSON, supra note 17.
32. S. COMM. ON GOVT OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at viii.
33. 122 CONG. Rac. S14,846 (daily ed. Aug. 27, 1976) (statement of Sen. Frank Church),
reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 338.
34. See S. COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at viii.
35. See id. at 3 (quoting National Emergencies Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin.
Law and Govt Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 20 (1998) (state-
ment of Sen. Charles Mathias, Co-Chair, S. Special Comm. on Nat'l Emergencies and Dele-
gated Emergency Powers).
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that Congress alone can declare war. '"36 Mathias submitted a resolu-
tion in 1971 to assess the consequences of terminating the ongoing
state of emergency initially declared by President Truman on the
eve of the Korean War in 1950.3 7 With Frank Church, a Democrat,
as a co-sponsor, Mathias introduced a resolution that called for the
creation of a Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the
National Emergency, which passed in 1972.38
The Special Committee, co-chaired by Senators Church and Ma-
thias,39 was the only congressional committee of its time to have a
membership comprised of an equal number of Republicans and
Democrats. 40 Senate leadership from both parties supported its ef-
forts.41 A subsequent Senate resolution changed the name of the
Special Committee to the Special Committee on National Emergen-
cies and Delegated Emergency Powers42 after the Committee
"quickly discovered that disorder enveloped the whole field of
emergency statutes and procedures," as evidenced by the fact that
"[n] ot one but four emergency proclamations remained in force.."
43
These Proclamations-also included in Part III, Table 1-were:
" President Franklin Roosevelt's declaration of national emer-
gency on March 9, 1933 to address the contemporary bank-
ing crisis by imposing a "bank holiday";4
4
• President Harry Truman's declaration of national
emergency on December 16, 1950 in response to the out-
break of the Korean War;
45
* President Richard Nixon's declaration of national emer-
gency on March 23, 1970 to address a postal strike;46 and
" President Nixon's declaration of national emergency on
August 15, 1971 to impose currency controls and restrict




38. See id. at 3-4.
39. See id. at 4.
40. See 120 CONG. REc. S15,739 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Frank
Church), reprinted in S. COMM. ON GoV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 76.
41. See id.
42. See S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 3-4.
43. See S. REP. No. 94-922, at 3 (1974), reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, SUpra
note 8, at 35.
44. See id.; S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 1.
45. See S. REP. No. 94-922, supra note 43, at 3, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 35.
46. See id. at 2-3.
47. See id.
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Throughout the early 1970s, the Special Committee also heard
testimony and received advice from legal and political science
scholars, prominent lawyers, two former U.S. Supreme Court jus-
tices, and all former U.S. Attorneys General living at the time.
48
Special Committee staff and the Library of Congress searched for
statutory provisions activated by declarations of national emer-
gency. They found that a declaration of national emergency made
470 statutory provisions available for the President's use.49
With a ringing call for reform, the Special Committee proposed
legislation to regulate national emergencies in its 1974 interim and
1976 final reports. 50 It noted that "protections and procedures guar-
anteed by the Constitution have, in varying degrees, been
abridged . . . .The President has had extraordinary powers-
powers to seize property and commodities, seize control of trans-
portation and communications, organize and control the means of
production, assign military forces abroad, and restrict travel."51 The
Special Committee laid much of the blame for the long duration
and vast expansion of U.S. emergency law at the feet of Congress:
"This dangerous state of affairs is a direct result of Congress's
failure to establish effective means for the handling of emergen-
cies . . . .Congress, through its own actions has transferred awe-
some magnitudes of power to the Executive without ever examining
the cumulative effect of that delegation of responsibility."
52
The Special Committee unanimously approved a draft National
Emergencies Act.53 The Committee intended the draft Act to serve
several key objectives,5 4 including deactivation of the emergency
powers that the four existing states of national emergency had acti-
vated.55 No statute had ever authorized a President to declare a na-
tional emergency or had prescribed conditions for its continuation
or termination. 56 Relying on Justice Jackson's concurring opinion
48. See id. at 3-4.
49. See id. at 5. The compilation is contained in S. SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TERMINATION
OF THE NAT'L EMERGENCY, EMERGENCY POWERS STATUTES: PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL LAW Now IN
EFEcr DELEGATING TO THE EXECUTIVE EXTRAORDINARY AUTHORITY IN TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY (Comm. Print 1950).
50. See id. at 1 ("The Special Committee... ends its work with an emphatic plea that the
National Emergencies Act, H.R., 3884, be passed as soon as possible .... The legislation is
long overdue. A majority of Americans alive today have lived their entire lives under emer-
gency rule.").
51. Id. at 3.
52. Id. at 1.
53. See S. REP. No. 93-1170, supra note 9, at 6-7, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 22.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 4.
56. See id. at 6; see also S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 351-54.
WINTER 2013]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
in Youngstown, the Special Committee believed that enacting a stat-
utory scheme to regulate the declaration and termination of future
emergencies would be "the best prescription to avoid any future
exercise of arbitrary authoritarian power" and would obligate the
President to follow clear legal guidelines when declaring and re-
sponding to future emergencies.
57
The Special Committee intended the statutory framework to reg-
ulate any and all presidential declarations of emergency, not simply
those specifically denominated "national emergency."58 It sought
"to provide the Executive Branch with an effective, workable
method for dealing with future emergencies in accord with Consti-
tutional processes."59 The Special Committee intended that the leg-
islation ensure transparency and public accountability regarding
the Executive Branch's exercise of emergency powers. 60
In 1975, the House passed an amended version of the legislation
by an overwhelming vote of 388-5.61 The bill was sent to the Sen-
ate, 62 where it was reported out unanimously in August 1976, with
amendments, by the Senate Committee on Government Opera-
tions.63 The Senate passed an amended version of the bill in August
1976, and the House assented to the Senate amendments shortly
thereafter.64 President Ford signed the National Emergencies Act
into law on September 14, 1976.65
B. Key Aspects of the Text and Its Evolution
By enacting the NEA, Congress intended to establish robust
mechanisms to ensure regular congressional review of declarations
57. See S. REP. No. 93-1170, supra note 9, at 6, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 22. "For as the Youngstown Case decided," the Special Committee
expounded, "where there is a statute, the Executive is obliged to use the statutory remedy;
where there are no lawful statutory guidelines is to invite so-called inherent powers to come
into play." Id.
58. See S. REP. No. 94-922, supra note 43, at 11, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 35 ("Congress must be prepared for possible efforts to thwart the
intent of the bill by dropping the wording 'national emergency' and introducing different
terminology. Committees must insure that all emergency legislation, however denominated,
has the same accountability and reporting requirements and termination procedures.").
59. See id. at 6.
60. See id. at 4.
61. See id. at 8.
62. See id.
63. See S. REP. No. 94-1168, at 19 (1976), reprinted in S. COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS,
supra note 8, at 308.
64. See S. COMM. ON GoV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 9.
65. Id.
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of national emergency. 66 Congress also compromised with the Exec-
utive Branch with regard to the future availability certain national
emergency powers.
67
1. Termination of Then-Active Emergency Powers
Although the NEA sought "[t]o terminate certain authorities
with respect to national emergencies still in effect, and to provide
for orderly implementation and termination of future national
emergencies," 68 Congress did not completely terminate the four na-
tional emergencies then in force. 69 Harold Relyea, a Congressional
Research Service scholar who played a central role in the work of
the Special Committee,70 opined that Congress did not possess the
power to terminate a national emergency itself, reasoning that de-
claring a national emergency is a valid exercise of the President's
Article II authority. 71 Congress, he wrote, can "terminate" a national
emergency only insofar as it possesses the authority to "render [de-
clared national emergencies] ineffective by returning to dormancy
the statutory authorities they had activated, thereby necessitating a
new declaration to activate standby statutory emergency authori-
ties. ' 72 In short, Congress could make an emergency toothless, but
could not make it disappear.
The initial draft of the NEA would have terminated all executive
emergency powers then in effect.73 The final version of the bill,
however, created eight exceptions.74 Congress made these excep-
tions because it concluded that the continued exercise of the emer-
gency powers authorized by those statutes had become "essential to
the functioning of the government" after "the prolongation of
66. See infra Part IL.B.4.
67. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
68. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255, 1255 (1976); S. REP.
No. 93-1170, supra note 9, at 7.
69. See 50 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).
70. See S. COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at v.
71. See HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-505 GOV, NATIONAL EMERGENCY
PowERs 12 (2007), reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 22.
72. See id.
73. See S. REP. No. 93-1170, supra note 9, at 7-10, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOVT OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 22.
74. See National Emergencies Act § 1651, 50 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006). These exemptions
included the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) (12 U.S.C. § 95a (2006) which the Trea-
sury Department deemed crucial for regulating trade and settling claims brought by U.S.
nationals whose property foreign nationals had wrongfully expropriated, and a provision al-
lowing the Department of Defense to make emergency exceptions to the requirement that it
conduct open procurement. See id.
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emergency rule in the United States. ' 75 The NEA was not, however,
intended to continue these emergency exceptions indefinitely, but
rather to "provide a reasonable period of time to make a transition
from emergency law to permanent law."
76
2. Emergency Powers Repealed by the NEA
The initial draft of the NEA provided for the repeal of forty-nine
sections or subsections of emergency powers statutes77 out of a total
of 470 such provisions identified by the Special Committee. 78 The
final version repealed only seven statutory provisions, 79 including:
" The President's power to criminalize, by Executive Order,
activities within military zones;80
" The Executive Branch's authority to strip of U.S. citizenship
and legal status any person deemed to have remained
outside the United States to avoid military service during a
national emergency;81 and
* The Federal Reserve's authority to regulate consumer credit
during a national emergency.
8 2
A report by the Senate Special Committee cited the decrease in
the number of statutes to be repealed as one of several com-
promises reached between the Executive Branch and the Senate
Committee on Government Operations. 3 Senator Mathias offered
a different explanation for the change, stating in a floor debate on
75. S. REP. No. 94-922, supra note 43, at 10, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS,
supra note 8, at 35.
76. See 121 CONG REc. S18,360 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974) (statement of Sen. Charles Ma-
thias) rerinted in S. COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 149; see also S. Rap. No. 94-
922, supra note 43, at 10, reprinted in S. COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 35.
77. See S. REP. No. 93-1170, supra note 9, at 10, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T
OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 35.
78. See S. REP. No. 94-922, supra note 43, at 5, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 35.
79. See National Emergencies Act § 501, 50 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).
80. See id. § 501 (e); Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 765 (repealed 1976). A prior
version of that Act was used as the mechanism for interning Japanese-Americans during
World War 11. See David A. Harris, On the Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu: "Liberty Lies in the
Hearts of Men and Women,"76 Mo. L. REv. 1, 3 (2011).
81. See National Emergencies Act § 501(a); Act ofJune 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 349(a) (10),
66 Stat. 268 (repealed 1976).
82. See National Emergencies Act § 501 (c); Act of Aug. 8, 1947, ch. 517, 61 Stat. 921
(repealed 1976).
83. See S. REP. No. 94-922, supra note 43, at 8-9, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 35.
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the bill that "most of the provisions that have been deleted from
our original list are to be taken care of in various deadwood
projects by the Codification Committee of the House of Represent-
atives."84 This statutory housecleaning does not seem to have oc-
curred, however, as most of the provisions the draft legislation
designated for repeal remain in force.
8 5
3. Future Declarations of National Emergencies
and Use of Emergency Powers
The initial draft of the NEA provided that the President would
only be authorized to declare a national emergency "[i] n the event
the President finds that the proclamation of a national emergency
is essential to the preservation, protection, and defense of the Con-
stitution, and is essential to the common defense, safety, or well-
being of the territory and people of the United States."8 6 This
language does not appear in the final bill, which places no condi-
tions on the President's ability to declare a national emergency.
8 7
The House Government Operations Committee removed this pro-
vision out of concern that the "overly broad" language "might have
been construed to confer upon the President statutory authority to
declare national emergencies, other than that which he now has
through various statutory delegations." 88 Congress, in other words,
did not intend the NEA to provide the President with independent
statutory grounds for declaring a national emergency. Rather, it
intended that the NEA regulate emergency powers exercised
pursuant to other statutes.
Although Congress did not intend the NEA to be an indepen-
dent legal basis that justified declaring an emergency, it did intend
the NEA to be the sole path to the exercise of emergency powers. 89
Any emergency powers activated by "provisions of law" authorizing
certain actions in a national emergency may only be used if the
President declared a national emergency in accordance with the
84. See 120 CONG. REc. S18,359 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1974) (statement of Sen. Charles Ma-
thias), reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 148.
85. Compare S. REp. No. 93-1170, supra note 9, at 10, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T
OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 35, with THRONSON, supra note 17.
86. See S. REP. No. 93-1170, supra note 9, at 7, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOVT OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 35.
87. See National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255.
88. See S. REP. No. 94-1168, supra note 63, at 3, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 308.
89. See National Emergencies Act § 201 (b), 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (b) (2006); S. Rap. No. 93-
1170, supra note 9, at 8, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 22.
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provisions of the NEA and otherwise complied with the Act.90 Both
the initial and final versions also specify that the President may only
exercise those emergency powers that he specified when declaring
a national emergency.9 1
4. Congressional Checks on Executive Emergency Powers
The draft NEA provided for congressional oversight of national
emergencies by imposing accountability and reporting require-
ments on the President.92 National emergencies are to end after six
months unless Congress voted by concurrent resolution to extend
the emergency; it could also vote at any time to terminate the emer-
gency.9 3 The draft bill also required that the President transmit to
Congress all orders, rules, and regulations promulgated pursuant to
a declared emergency.94 The final bill preserved this obligation.95 It
also required that, every six months following a declaration of na-
tional emergency, the President must submit to Congress an ac-
counting of expenditures "directly attributable to the exercise of
powers and authorities conferred by such declaration.
'96
At the Ford Administration's request,9 7 Congress removed the
provision specifying that absent further congressional action, a dec-
laration of national emergency would terminate after six months.
But as enacted, the NEA still imposes a requirement that "[n]ot
later than six months after a national emergency is declared, and
not later than the end of each six-month period thereafter.., each
90. See National Emergencies Act § 201(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1621(b) (2006); S. REP. No. 93-
1170, supra note 9, at 8, reprinted in S. COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 22.
Furthermore, no other law may supersede the title containing this particular provision unless
it did so in explicit terms. See National Emergencies Act § 201(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1621(b)
(2006).
91. See National Emergencies Act § 301, 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (2006); S. REP. No. 93-1170,
supra note 9, at 8, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 22. The pri-
mary purpose animating this requirement was to ensure that the Executive Branch would
provide notice to the public and Congress. See S. REP. No. 93-1170, supra note 9, at 8, reprinted
in S. COMM. ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 22; see also H. REP. No. 94-238, at 8
(1975), reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 190.
92. See S. REP. No. 93-1170, supra note 9, at 8-9, reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERA-
TIo0Ns, supra note 8, at 22.
93. See id. at 8. The Supreme Court subsequently held that using concurrent resolutions
to override executive action was unconstitutional. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
94. See S. REP. No. 93-1170, supra note 9, at 8-9, reprinted in S. CoMM. ON GOv'T OPERA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 22.
95. See National Emergencies Act § 401(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2006).
96. See id. § 401(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1641(c) (2006).
97. See 121 CONG. REc. H8,343 (daily ed. Sept. 4, 1975) (statement of Rep. Robert
Drinan), reprinted in S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 257.
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House of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a concurrent
resolution to determine whether that emergency shall be termi-
nated."95 The enacted version also specifies that declared emergen-
cies will terminate automatically after one year unless renewed by
the President,99 and that the President may terminate a national
emergency at any time.100
Congress has enacted two significant amendments to the NEA
since its passage. First, although it retains the requirement that
Congress meet every six months to consider terminating national
emergency powers, the statute now provides that a joint resolution,
rather than a concurrent resolution, is the appropriate mechanism
for terminating national emergencies.'," Like a typical bill, a joint
resolution requires the President's signature to become law, and
Congress can override a President's veto of a joint resolution with a
two-thirds majority in both houses. Second, the emergency author-
ity granted under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) is not
exempt from the modern statute, 10 2 since the TWEA no longer pro-
vides a basis for declaring a national emergency in peacetime.
10 3
Notwithstanding these differences, the plain text of the contempo-
rary statute clearly reflects Congress's intent to curb the unchecked
propagation of national emergencies and the unrestrained exercise
of emergency powers.
C. Subsequent History
Though Senators Church and Mathias had "hope [d] that the na-
tion enjoys such domestic tranquility that [the NEA's] authorities
are never invoked,' ' 10 4 the 1979 Iranian revolution soon led to the
first post-NEA declaration of national emergency. In a tersely
worded Executive Order, President Carter declared "that the situa-
tion in Iran constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States,"
leading him to "hereby declare a national emergency to deal with
98. See National Emergencies Act § 202(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d) (2006) (emphasis
added).
99. See id. § 202(d), 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d) (2006).
100. See id. § 202(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (2006).
101. See id. § 202(a) (1), 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (1) (2006). For a discussion of the power of a
past Congress to bind a future Congress, see supra note 11.
102. See id. § 1651.
103. See 12 U.S.C. § 95a (2006).
104. See S. COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at vii.
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that threat." 10 5 The declaration froze all property subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States in which the government and central
bank of Iran had an interest.10 6 Remarkably, that emergency is still
in effect today, since, according to President Obama, "our relations
with Iran have not yet returned to normal, and the process of im-
plementing the January 19, 1981 agreements with Iran is still
underway.
' 07
The emergency has continued for over thirty-three years, in di-
rect contravention of Congress's intent to prohibit perpetual states
of emergency. This situation was made possible largely by the fact
that Congress has not followed its own statutory requirement to
consider every six months a joint resolution on terminating the
emergency. A Congressional Research Service report stated that in
May 1980, the Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee sent a
letter to the Speaker of the House that was intended to fulfill this
requirement. 108 This letter is the only expression of Congress's
judgment that any state of national emergency should continue.10 9
The Congressional Record is devoid of evidence that a similar let-
ter, let alone a concurrent or joint resolution, was ever again con-
sidered regarding this or any other national emergency. 10
The judiciary, meanwhile, has declined to give any meaningful
force to the requirement that Congress meet to consider such a
resolution. Beacon Products Corp. v. Reagan concerned a corporation
that was seeking to trade with Nicaragua but was barred from doing
so by trade restrictions issued pursuant to a national emergency
pertaining to Nicaragua."' Both parties stipulated that Congress
had not met to consider a resolution regarding whether the na-
tional emergency should be terminated," 2 even though the NEA
provides that emergency powers "shall be effective and remain in
effect... only in accordance with this Act."1 3 Nonetheless, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in an opinion written by then-
105. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979).
106. See id.
107. Notice on Continuing the National Emergency with Respect to Iran, 75 Fed. Reg.
69,569 (Nov. 10, 2010).
108. MARK W. LowFEmHAL & ELLEN C. COLIER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 1B80001, IAN:
EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL REACTIONS AND RoLES 31-32 (1981).
109. See id.
110. This finding is consistent with that of legal scholars. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The
Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1080 (2004); Jules Lobel, Emergency Powers and the
Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE LJ. 1385, 1416 (1989).
111. See Beacon Prods. Corp. v Reagan, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
112. See id. at 4.
113. 50 U.S.C. § 1621(b) (2006).
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Judge Breyer, held that the national emergency was valid notwith-
standing Congress's failure to vote. The court reasoned:
It seems far more likely that Congress meant the "shall meet to
consider a vote" language to give those who want to end the
emergency the chance to force a vote on the issue, rather than
to require those who do not want to end the emergency to force
congressional action to prevent automatic termination.'
14
Because of this softening of the mandatory force of "shall" under
the NEA-along with congressional inaction and expansionary Ex-
ecutive Branches-thirty national emergencies currently remain in
effect in the United States.
III. KEY DOMESTIC IMPACTS OF DECLARING A NATIONAL EMERGENCY
To examine the powers that accrue to the Executive after a decla-
ration of national emergency is to enter a world that contrasts
sharply with the traditional conception of the United States as be-
ing a government of limited and enumerated powers. The thirty
national emergencies now in effect in the United States are more
than abstract or limited exercises of presidential authority. Each
emergency activates powers in over 160 provisions of statutory law,
dozens of presidential orders, and numerous other federal regula-
tions. 115 As discussed in depth below,1 16 these declarations of emer-
gency grant the President many of the same sweeping powers that
Congress sought to limit when it passed the NEA in 1976,1 7 as well
as additional powers that did not exist when the Act was passed.1 8
Emergency powers that are presently in effect, or need only a
presidential order to become operative, raise troubling questions as
to whether the executive power, in its full extent, is consistent with
our conceptions of the presidency or limited government. Declared
national emergencies have, in recent years, provided legal justifica-
tions for the exercise of myriad, diverse domestic powers. These
114. See Beacon Prods. Corp., 814 F.2d at 5 (emphasis in original). But see LOWENTHAL &
COLLIER, supra note 108.
115. See id.
116. See infra Part III.A, C-D.
117. Compare S. SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TERMINATION OF THE NAT'L EMERGENCY, supra note
49, with THRONSON, supra note 17 (enumerating executive powers activated by a declaration
of national emergency).
118. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2006) (granting the President the power to freeze
the assets of, and prohibit donations to, designated U.S. or alien natural persons or
organizations).
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powers have included the extrajudicial authority to deprive desig-
nated persons'19-including U.S. citizens 120 and organizations
operating in the United States12-of access to personal assets and
even to donations of humanitarian items such as food, clothing,
and medicine. 122 The Executive Branch has also unilaterally sus-
pended wage-rate requirements for public contracts. 23 During a na-
tional emergency, the President-and, in some cases, Cabinet
officials-also possess the authority to unilaterally seize control of
radio and television stations, phone systems, and the Internet; 24 to
impose extensive food-supply controls; 25 and to seize commercial
vessels.1
26
The following table presents the thirty national emergencies cur-
rently in effect in the United States.
TABLE 1: DECLARATIONS OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY
CURRENTLY IN EFFECT
12 7
EXECUTIVE ORDER DATE FIRST
OR PROCLAMATION SUBJECT DECLARED
Proc. 2040 Bank Holiday Mar. 6, 1933
Proc. 2941 Korean War Dec. 16, 1950
Proc. 2942 Postal Strike Mar. 23, 1970
119. See id.
120. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, SPECIALLY
DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS 427 (Oct. 18, 2012), available at http://www.
treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/tllsdn.pdf (designating Abdul Rahman S. Taha); Eric
Sandberg-Zakian, Counterterrorism, the Constitution, and the Civil-Criminal Divide: Evaluating the
Designation of U.S. Persons Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 48 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 95, 96-97 (2011).
121. See, e.g., U.S. DEF'T OF THE TREASuRY, supra note 120, at 432 (designating Tamils
Rehabilitation Organization).
122. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2006).
123. See 40 U.S.C. § 3147 (2006); see also infta notes 155-164 and accompanying text.
124. See 47 U.S.C. § 606 (2006). The Obama Administration has interpreted the statute as
giving the government this same plenary authority over contemporary forms of communica-
tion. See infta note 171 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1371, 1427a(a), 1444 (2006).
126. See 50 U.S.C. § 191 (2006).
127. Current as of Feb. 12, 2013. Information compiled from search of U.S. Government
Printing Office documents at Federal Digital System, U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2013). The first four documents in the table are
indicated by their subject, the rest by their title.
[VOL. 46:2
Reforming America's Emergency Law Regime
Proc. 4074 Balance of Payments Crisis Aug. 15, 1971
E.O. 12170 Blocking Iranian Government Property Nov. 14, 1979
E.O. 12938 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Nov. 14, 1994
Destruction
E.O. 12947 Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Jan. 23, 1994
Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle
East Peace Process
E.O. 12957 Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Mar. 15, 1995
Respect to the Development of Iranian
Petroleum Resources
E.O. 12978 Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Oct. 21, 1995
Transactions with Significant Narcotics
Traffickers
Proc. 6867 Regulating the Anchorage and Mar. 1, 1996
Movement of Vessels with Respect to
Cuba
E.O. 13047 Prohibiting New Investment in Burma May 22, 1997
E.O. 13067 Blocking Sudanese Government Property Nov. 3, 1997
and Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan
E.O. 13159 Blocking Property of the Government of June 21, 2000
the Russian Federation Relating to the
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium
Extracted from Nuclear Weapons
E.O. 13219 Blocking Property of Persons Who June 26, 2001
Threaten International Stabilization
Efforts in the Western Balkans
E.O. 13222 Continuing Export Control Regulations Aug. 17, 2001
Proc. 7463 Declaration of National Emergency by Sep. 14, 2001
Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks
E.O. 13224 Blocking Property and Prohibiting Sep. 23, 2001
Transactions with Persons Who Commit,
Threaten to Commit, or Support
Terrorism
E.O. 13288 Blocking Property of Persons Mar. 6, 2003
Undermining Democratic Processes or
Institutions in Zimbabwe
E.O. 13303 Protecting the Development Fund for May 22, 2003
Iraq and Certain Other Property in
Which Iraq Has an Interest
E.O. 13338 Blocking Property of Certain Persons and May 11, 2004
Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods
to Syria
E.O. 13348 Blocking Property of Certain Persons and July 22, 2004
Prohibiting the Importation of Certain
Goods from Liberia
E.O. 13396 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Feb. 7, 2006
Contributing to the Conflict in C6te
d'Ivoire
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E.O. 13405 Blocking Property of Certain Persons June 16, 2006
Undermining Democratic Processes or
Institutions in Belarus
E.O. 13413 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Oct. 27, 2006
Contributing to the Conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
E.O. 13441 Blocking Property of Persons Aug. 1, 2007
Undermining the Sovereignty of
Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and
Institutions
E.O. 13466 Continuing Certain Restrictions with June 26, 2008
Respect to North Korea and North
Korean Nationals
E.O. 13536 Blocking Property of Certain Persons Apr. 12, 2010
Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia
E.O. 13566 Blocking Property and Prohibiting Feb. 25, 2011
Certain Transactions Related to Libya
E.O. 13581 Blocking Property of Transnational July 25, 2011
Criminal Organizations
E.O. 13611 Blocking Property of Persons May 16, 2012
Threatening the Peace, Security, or
Stability of Yemen
The remainder of this Part analyzes select emergency statutes
that significantly affect the domestic sphere of American life. It fo-
cuses on powers that arguably have the most far-reaching effect on
the constitutional rights and economic livelihoods of U.S.
residents.128
Section A details the power of the Executive Branch to deprive
individuals and organizations of access to assets and basic humani-
tarian aid during a national emergency. Section B outlines the
power of the Executive to suspend wage laws for public contracts.
Section C provides other major emergency powers statutes that
have not been used in recent years, but which can be activated at
the President's direction pursuant to any of the thirty national
emergencies in effect. Section D examines Presidential Emergency
Action Documents (PEADs) and plans for so-called continuity of
government (i.e., the effort to preserve and maintain essential gov-
ernment functions in the midst of presidentially designated emer-
gencies). Available information indicates that some PEADs confer
on the Executive the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
and detain without charge persons considered to be subversive.
128. This Note can, for reasons of space, analyze only some of these powers. A reasonably
complete catalog of the powers that are activated for the use of the Executive Branch follow-
ing a presidential declaration of national emergency is available online. See THRONSON, supra
note 17.
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A. Targeted Financial Incapacitation:
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act
Like the 1976 National Emergencies Act, Congress passed the In-
ternational Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in 1977 to
"revise and delimit" the President's emergency authority.129 The
IEEPA was meant to replace the TWEA, which was used as a means
of imposing broad-ranging economic controls that sometimes bore
little relation to the declared national emergency authorizing
them.130 The IEEPA primarily concerns international financial
transactions' 3' and transactions that otherwise "involv[e] an inter-
est" of a foreign national. 3 2 But the federal government has fre-
quently applied the emergency powers granted by the statute to
"U.S. persons"-people and organizations with legal status in the
United States, including U.S. citizens.1 33 Courts have also construed
"interest" to include assets that are wholly owned by a U.S. person
but in which a foreign national has a potential beneficial interest.
1 34
Declaring a national emergency under the NEA also activates
presidential powers under the IEEPA. 35 The IEEPA specifies that
the President may only use powers it authorizes to deal with an "un-
usual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security,
foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President
declares a national emergency with respect to such threat."136 The
statute further provides, somewhat ambiguously, that the President
may only use IEEPA powers activated by a declaration of national
emergency to "deal with" that specific emergency. 1 7 Unlike the
NEA, the IEEPA does not include an automatic termination provi-
sion nor requires that Congress vote to perpetuate the powers that
it grants.
One article concisely summarized the operation of the IEEPA:
In practice, this authority is exercised in what can roughly be
described as a three-step process. First, the President issues an
Executive Order declaring a national emergency, describing
the type of individuals who will be sanctioned, and delegating
129. See S. REP. No. 95-466, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4540, 4541.
130. See id. at 1-3.
131. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (a)(1)(A) (2006).
132. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B)-(C) (2006).
133. See, e.g., supra note 120.
134. See, e.g., Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2002).
135. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (a) (2006).
136. See id.
137. See id. § 1701(b).
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the task of implementing sanctions to the Secretary of State or
the Secretary of the Treasury. Second, the cabinet member
charged with implementation designates particular individuals
(people or entities) as fitting the description in the Executive
Order. Third, the [U.S. Department of the] Treasury's Office
of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC")-the executive entity
charged with carrying out the sanctions-proceeds to block all
property of and transactions involving the designated
individuals.
13
The IEEPA thus grants the Executive Branch the power to freeze
the assets of, and prohibit financial transactions involving, individu-
als designated by Executive Order. This includes the power to pro-
hibit bank payments and transfers of credit insofar as they "involve"
an interest of a designated person, entity, or country, 139 and to
prohibit the holding, use, or transfer of property implicating a rele-
vant foreign interest.140 The President may exercise these powers
over property belonging to any person within the jurisdiction of the
United States.14 1 Indeed, the Treasury Department's nearly six-hun-
dred-page list of blocked persons and organizations contains the
names of numerous U.S. persons.
142
This summary power to block persons from accessing their assets
extends even to basic life necessities. Although one section of the
IEEPA exempts from the President's authority "donations, by per-
sons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of articles, such
as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve
human suffering,"143 another section permits the President to regu-
late or prohibit the donation of these items if "the President deter-
mines that such donations . . . would seriously impair his ability to
deal with" a declared national emergency. 144 Anyone who violates
the IEEPA is subject to a civil penalty up to $250,000;14 5 a willful
violation may incur a criminal penalty up to $1,000,000 and up to
twenty years in prison.1 46 Every President who has declared a na-
tional emergency and exercised IEEPA powers pursuant to that
emergency has prohibited such donations.1
47
138. See Sandberg-Zakian, supra note 120, at 100.
139. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(A) (2006).
140. See id. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
141. See id. § 1702(a)(1)(A)-(B).
142. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 120.
143. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b) (2) (2006).
144. See id.
145. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1705(a)-(b) (West 2012).
146. See id. § 1705(a)-(c).
147. See infta Executive Orders listed in Part III, Table 1.
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Courts have interpreted the scope of "involving an interest" ex-
pansively to encompass any property that might benefit a desig-
nated foreign national.1 48 In Global Relief Foundation v. O'Neill,149 the
federal government froze the assets of the second-largest Islamic
charity in the United States, which ceased to exist less than one year
later.150 The court held that the IEEPA authorized the Executive
Branch to freeze assets that it determines might benefit a desig-
nated foreign person or country "even if a U.S. citizen is the legal
owner," notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on
deprivation of property without due process of law.
151
The President thus has the authority to issue an Executive Order
to block all the assets of a U.S. citizen or permanent resident-not
to mention a person with a more tenuous immigration status-and
prohibit donations of food or medicine to that person. No money
may be paid from an account at a financial institution over which
the United States has jurisdiction if the Executive Branch has "des-
ignated" the account holder under the IEEPA. 152 Moreover, a per-
son whom the Treasury Department deems a "Special Designated
Global Terrorist"153 may only receive free emergency medical care
if granted a license by the Department. 54 The IEEPA thus grants
the Executive Branch power not merely over certain property or
activities of designated people, but over the very survival of a
human being within the jurisdiction of the United States.
B. Suspension of Minimum Wage Requirements in Public Contracts
Federal law imposes minimum wage requirements for contracts
to which the United States or the District of Columbia is a party. 155
Among other requirements, such contracts must prescribe mini-
mum wages for the various types of laborers who will be employed
under the contract, with the wage of each laborer based on the lo-
cal going rate for workers in the same occupation.156 Workers are
entitled to overtime pay157 and a weekly paycheck. 5 8 The federal
148. See, e.g., Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2002).
149. Id. at 750.
150. See Sandberg-Zakian, supra note 120, at 95.
151. See Global Relief Found., 315 F.3d at 753; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
152. See 31 C.F.R. § 594.504 (2009).
153. See 31 C.F.R. § 594.310 (2012); see also 31 C.F.R. 594.201 (2012).
154. See 31 C.F.R. § 594.507 (2009).
155. See 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3148 (2006).
156. See id. § 3142(a)-(b).
157. See id. § 3142(e).
158. See id. § 3142(c).
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government may terminate a contract to which it is a party if the
contractor fails to pay wages as the contract provides. 159
During a national emergency, however, 40 U.S.C. § 3147 autho-
rizes the Executive to suspend all of these provisions.160 President
Bush did so in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 16 Rather than
invoking the NEA to declare a national emergency as the Act re-
quires, President Bush stated, in his order suspending minimum
wage and other requirements, "I find that the conditions caused by
Hurricane Katrina constitute a 'national emergency' within the
meaning of [40 U.S.C. § 3147]."162 The legality of such a means of
declaring a national emergency was never subjected to challenge,
however, as the President revoked the Proclamation less than two
months later. 63 The suspension was not retroactively applied.1
64
C. Emergency Powers Not in Active Use
The Executive Branch has dozens of additional statutory provi-
sions at its disposal that grant it extraordinary powers during a na-
tional emergency. 65 The notice requirement of the NEA provides
that the President may exercise these powers either by declaring a
national emergency or by issuing an Executive Order stating that
the President will exercise such powers pursuant to an existing de-
clared emergency. 166 For example, the President, acting through
the Secretary of Agriculture, has broad authority during a national
emergency to impose supply constraints to influence prices of vari-
ous crops.167 The President may also unilaterally order the inspec-
tion and seizure of commercial vessels during a national
emergency. 68
Provisions that empower the President to seize control of the na-
tion's communications infrastructure pose even greater implica-
tions for individual liberty. If the President "deems it necessary in
159. See id. § 3143.
160. See id. § 3147.
161. See Proclamation No. 7924, 3 C.F.R. 104-06 (2006).
162. Id. at 104.
163. See Proclamation No. 7959, 3 C.F.R. 138 (2006).
164. Some commentators have emphasized the significance of this suspension, drawing a
link between President Bush's suspension of prevailing wage requirements and a slew of alle-
gations of severe labor abuses in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. See, e.g., Haley E. Olam &
Erin S. Stamper, Note, The Suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act and the Exploitation of Migrant
Workers in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 24 HoFsTRA LAB. & EMP. LJ. 145 (2006).
165. See THRONSON, supra note 17.
166. See 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (2006); supra Part II.A.
167. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1371, 1427a(a), 1444 (2006).
168. See 50 U.S.C. § 191 (2006).
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the interest of national security or defense" during a war or na-
tional emergency, he is authorized to suspend or alter rules for
broadcast stations or devices, close "any station for radio communi-
cation, or any device capable of emitting electromagnetic
radiations.., which is suitable for use as a navigational aid beyond
five miles," or "authorize the use or control of any such station or
device.., by any department of the Government." 169 The President
also may exercise broad control over "any facility or station for wire
communication," with the power to amend regulations for such fa-
cilities and stations, seize them, or employ them for government
use. 17
0
These provisions may reasonably be interpreted as authorizing
the government to seize and control all radio stations, broadcast
television stations, cable television stations, and telecommunica-
tions networks in the United States during a declared national
emergency. This, at any rate, is the position of the Obama Adminis-
tration. During the debate over the now-moribund "internet kill
switch" bill, the Obama Administration expressed its position to
Congress that the President already has authority under the NEA
and the above provisions to control Internet traffic in an emer-
gency. 71 Thus, the only apparent legal obstacle standing between
present conditions and this degree of government control over
mass media and telecommunications is a presidential order.
D. Presidential Emergency Action Documents:
Fundamental Violations of the Constitutional Order?
Presidential declarations of national emergency enable the presi-
dent to use draft classified orders to exercise perhaps even more
expansive powers, known variously as Presidential Emergency Ac-
tion Documents or Presidential Emergency Action Directives
(PEADs).1 72 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
169. 47 U.S.C. § 606(c) (2006). Just compensation is required in each instance. See id.
§ 606(e).
170. Id. § 606(d).Just compensation is likewise required. See id. § 606(e).
171. See Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 79 (2010), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.
gov/download/2010-06-15-reitinger-testimony (prepared statement of Philip R. Reitinger,
Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security).
172. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY [FEMA], FEMA MANuAL 5400.2 111 (effective
Feb. 29, 2000), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20030313025356/http://www.fema.
gov/pdf/library/5400_2.pdf, Marc Ambinder, The Day After, NAT'L J. (Apr. 11, 2011, 4:47
PM), available at http://www.nationaljoumal.com/magazine/govemment-still-unprepared-
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defines these documents as "[f] inal drafts of Presidential messages,
proposed legislation proclamations, and other formal documents,
including DOJ [Department of Justice]-issued cover sheets ad-
dressed to the President, to be issued in event of a Presidentially-
declared national emergency." 73 They originated as part of
Eisenhower-era planning for continuity of government (COG)
procedures, which were intended to maintain major government
operations during and following a nuclear exchange with the Soviet
Union.174 The situations in which the Executive Branch plans to
employ such procedures, however, now encompass a broad array of
declared national emergencies.
175
The Executive's concern to plan for COG seems eminently rea-
sonable, given the terrible consequences natural and human-
caused disasters can have on governmental institutions and U.S.
residents, particularly vulnerable populations. This wise desire to
plan appropriately for disasters appears to be a significant motive in
the creation and maintenance of PEADs.176 But court records and
numerous government documents indicate that the methods that
some PEADs are intended to employ to ensure COG may be inimi-
cal to the contemporary constitutional order. The powers these
plans purport to grant are titanic in scale, vastly outstripping even
for-disaster-20110411. Ambinder departs from publicly available information in terming
PEADs "presidential emergency-action directives." See id.
173. FEMA MANuAL, supra note 172, at 111.
174. See generally Matthew L. Conaty, The Atomic Midwife: The Eisenhower Administration's
Continuity-of-Government Plans and the Legacy of "Constitutional Dictatorship, "62 RUTGERS L. REv.
627 (2010) (providing a detailed historical account and legal analysis of Eisenhower-era con-
tinuity of government planning). The Truman Administration also appears to have contem-
plated asserting this kind of emergency executive authority. See Hobson v. Brennan, 646 F.
Supp. 884, 897 (D.D.C. 1986) (reproducing an FBI memorandum that states, "A plan of
action has been prepared . . . to implement the apprehension and detention of individuals
listed in the Security Index and for the seizure of specified contraband. This plan is formally
known as the 'Program for Apprehension and Detention of Persons Considered Potentially
Dangerous to the National Defense and Public Safety of the United States.' "). For interesting
accounts of the involvement-dating back to the 1970s-in COG planning of former Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and former Vice President Dick Cheney, see, for example,
JAMES MANN, RISE OF THE VULCANS 138-45, 295-96 (2004); PETER DALE ScoTr, THE ROAD TO
9/11 183-87 (2007).
175. See FEMA MANuAL, supra note 172, at 111.
176. See, e.g., Ambinder, supra note 172 ("The PEADs provide Cabinet secretaries, White
House aides, and other senior officials with what amount to checklists: Have you called here?
Have you waited for 'x' amount of time? Are you sure that FEMA hasn't done 'y'? After they
answer the questions, the checklists then empower the officials to temporarily assume certain
presidential authority to make sure that the government can function. The directives even
spell out what happens if someone lower in the line of succession takes advantage of uncer-
tainty to assume presidential authority. The documents are written, essentially, to deal with
possible coups d'htat.").
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the significant expansions of presidential power during the past
decade.
The history of COG planning and PEADs exhibits two major
trends: first, consistency over time in the severe limitations of lib-
erty that the documents purport to authorize; and second, an in-
crease over time in the number and nature of circumstances in
which federal officials deem it appropriate to significantly curtail
civil rights. The Eisenhower administration "commissioned execu-
tive agencies to develop continuity measures [COG]-the means by
which a fragmented federal government could begin to exercise au-
thority over a devastated nation" after a nuclear attack.1 77 Such
plans included establishing alternate locations to carry out federal
functions 178 and even creating new federal agencies, such as the Of-
fice of Censorship, National Housing Agency, and National Man-
power Agency.
1 79
Although modern-era PEADs are generally unavailable to the
public,1 80 numerous recently released Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) memoranda that describe these documents indicate that
these plans have included unilateral suspension of habeas corpus by
the Executive Branch,18 1 martial law,'8 2 apprehension and deten-
tion of "subversive" individuals listed in a government "Security In-
dex,"1 3 and restrictions on travel, including the power to invalidate
177. See Conaty, supra note 174, at 633.
178. See A.H. BELMONT, MEMORANDUM TO L.V. BOARDMAN ON DEFENSE PLANS 1 (1958),
available at http://www.governmentattic.org/4docs/FBI-Presid-Emerg-Action-Docs_1958-
1979.pdf (stating that "initial [PEADs] approved by the President were available for inclusion
in our personal 'Emergency Kit.' Also, that additional copies for pre-positioning at our site
would be provided upon verification of secure storage facilities at [the FBI's relocation
site] .... "); see also David S. Rotenstein, The Undisclosed Location Disclosed: Continuity of Govern-
ment Sites as Recent Past Resources, http://blog.historian4hire.net/2010/07/15/coldwarsites/
#_edn9 (last updated Aug. 22, 2011).
179. See Conaty, supra note 174, at 637-38.
180. I was unable to locate the exact text of any PEADs. Cf id. at 636 (noting the author
was likewise unable to locate the text of PEADs). An inquiry to the Reagan Library revealed
that they are still classified.
181. See, e.g., MEMORANDUM TO W.C. SULLIVAN ON PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY ACTION Docu-
MENTS (1967), available at http://www.governmentattic.org/4docs/FBI-Presid-Emerg-Action-
Docs_1958-1979.pdf. The Constitution explicitly reserves the power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus solely to Congress. See U.S. CONsT. art I, § 9 (providing, among Congress's
enumerated powers, that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it"); id.
art. II (containing no provision for presidential suspension of habeas corpus). For an exten-
sive discussion of President Lincoln's efforts to suspend habeas corpus during the American
Civil War, see, for example, CLINTON ROssITER, CoNsTrru-InoNAL DICTAToRSHIP 223-39
(1948).
182. See, e.g., MEMORANDUM FROM W.O. CREGG TO L'ALLIER ON DEFENSE PLANS 2 (1961),
available at http://www.governmentattic.org/4docs/FBI-Presid-Emerg-Action-Docs-1958-
1979.pdf.
183. See Hobson v. Brennan, 646 F. Supp. 884, 896 (D.D.C. 1986).
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the passports of U.S. citizens attempting to leave the country. 18 4 A
recent analysis of declassified Eisenhower Administration docu-
ments concluded that "[t]here is no indication that these papers
were examined or approved by either branch of Congress or the
federal courts.'" 1 5 The only mechanism for legal review of these
documents appears to have been a directive to agencies to "consult
with the President's Special Counsel... [i]n the case of those Ac-
tion Papers which are of an extremely sensitive nature."
' 1 6
PEADs drafted during the Eisenhower years that pose troubling
implications for constitutional rights apparently still exist. 87 A 1978
FBI memorandum provides a remarkable summary of several
PEADs:
PEAD 17 authorizes the Secretary of State to seize property.
PEAD 20 is an Executive Order directing the Secretary of De-
fense to restore and maintain law and order when it has bro-
ken down. PEAD 21 is an Executive Order providing for a
temporary suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus.
PEAD 18 is a proclamation delegating to the Attorney General
the authority to prescribe more stringent documentary re-
quirements for citizens and aliens entering or leaving the
United States. It ... in effect places authority in both the At-
torney General and the Secretary of State to regulate the flow
of persons into and out of the country.
1 88
The circumstances under which these plans would be executed
expanded over time to include events other than nuclear warfare.
For example, an April 1968 Johnson Administration FBI memoran-
dum recommended implementing a "Priority Apprehension Pro-
gram based on dangerousness of individuals on SI"-the
government's Security Index-and noted that the government had
"recently amended [its] definition of a dangerous person in new
184. See, e.g., F.J. CASSIDY, MEMORANDUM T. W. LEAvrrr ON FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLAN D
(1976), available at http://www.governmentattic.org/4docs/FBI-Presid-Emerg-Action-
Docs_1958-1979.pdf.
185. Conaty, supra note 174, at 636.
186. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 187-212; MEMORANDUM TO W.O CREGAR ON PRESI-
DENTIAL EMERGENCY AcTION DOcuMENTs (BUPLANS) (1978), available at http://www.govern
mentattic.org/4docs/FBI-Presid-Emerg-Action-Docs_1958-1979.pdf.
188. See MEMORANDUM TO W.O. CREGAR, supra note 187.
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Presidential Emergency Action Document 6, broadening it to in-
clude terrorists or persons who would interfere with Government
operation and defense effort [sic] ."189 The memorandum implied
that the Index and detention program were widely applicable to a
variety of emergencies: "The Security Index contains names of indi-
viduals who should be considered for immediate apprehension and
detention in the event of a national emergency in order to safeguard the
internal security of the United States by preventing sabotage, espio-
nage, and insurrection. The list now consists of over 10,000
names.'19 The Nixon Administration continued this effort, in great
part through the efforts of James McCord, an Army officer and
Watergate burglar.191
There appear to be no publicly available memoranda describing
PEADs that are more recent than 1979. News sources and Congres-
sional testimony, however, indicate that planning in a similar vein
occurred throughout the Reagan years. A remarkable exchange be-
tween Representatives Jack Brooks (D-TX), Daniel Inouye (D-HI),
and Iran-Contra conspirator Col. Oliver North during the 1987
Iran-Contra hearings illustrates this ongoing planning:
REP. BROOKS: Colonel North, in your work at the NSC [Na-
tional Security Council], were you not assigned, at one time, to
work on plans for the continuity of government in the event of
a major disaster? ...
SEN. [DANIEL] INOUYE: I believe that question touches
upon a highly sensitive and classified area so may I request that
you not touch upon that, sir?
REP. BROOKS: I was particularly concerned, Mr. Chairman,
because I read in Miami papers, and several others, that there
189. Hobson v. Brennan, 646 F. Supp. 884, 896 (D.D.C. 1986) (reproducing an FBI mem-
orandum to W.C. Sullivan from C.D. Brennan entitled "Program for Apprehension and De-
tention of Persons Considered Potentially Dangerous to the National Defense and Public
Safety of the United States (DETPRO)").
190. Id. at 897 (emphasis added).
191. See CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 23 (1974) (cited in
Peter Dale Scott, The Doomsday Project and Deep Events, AsiA-PAcIFICJ., vol. 9, no. 2, Nov. 21,
2011) (noting that Watergate burglar and Air Force Reserve Lieutenant Colonel James Mc-
Cord was assigned to the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the mission of which "was to
draw up lists of radicals and to help develop contingency plans for censorship of the news
media and U.S. mail in time of war"); see also, e.g., DAVID F. KRUGLER, THIS IS ONLY A TEST:
How WASHINGTON, D.C. PREPARED FOR NUCLEAR WAR 184 (2006) ("Soon, the [D.C. Office of
Civil Defense (against nuclear attack)] was being recast as the Office of Emergency Prepared-
ness. Its major duties were now readiness for natural disasters and crowd control for parades
and demonstrations.").
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had been a plan developed by that same agency, a contingency
plan in the event of emergency, that would suspend the Ameri-
can constitution. And I was deeply concerned about it and
wondered if that was the area in which he had worked. I be-
lieve that it was and I wanted to get his confirmation. 192
Representative Brooks was referring to a Miami Herald report that
Col. North and FEMA developed a secret contingency plan that
called for
suspension of the Constitution, turning control of the United
States over to FEMA, appointing military commanders to run
state and local governments, and declaring martial law during
a national crisis. The plan did not define national crisis, but it
was understood to be nuclear war, violent and widespread in-
ternal dissent or national opposition against a military invasion
abroad. 1
93
A 1991 CNN investigative report gave further details of the Rea-
gan administration's COG planning.19 4 The documentary revealed
that plans drafted under the direction of then-Vice President
George H.W. Bush included a separate line of succession to the
presidency that was not only unknown to Congress, but conflicted
with the line of succession provided in the Constitution and statu-
tory law. 195 This "Presidential Successor Support System" purport-
edly included, at one point or another, Howard Baker, a White
House Chief of Staff under Reagan; Richard Helms, the former
director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and Jean Kirk-
patrick, the UN Ambassador-none of whom were in the constitu-
tional or statutorily prescribed line of succession. 196
Publicly available information shows that the Clinton, George W.
Bush, and Obama Administrations have maintained preexisting
192. Jasonmacs, Jack Brooks Questions Oliver North, DAILYMOTION (Jan. 16, 2007), http://
www.dailymotion.com/video/xzwj6_jack-brooks-questions-oliver-north-news (author tran-
script of user-posted recording of hearing); see alsoJanet Cawley & Christopher Drew, Probers
Ask North About Crisis Plan, CHI. TraB. (July 14, 1987), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
1987-07-14/news/8702210462_1-opponents-of-contra-aid-covert-policy-john-poindexter (re-
porting on the exchange between Brooks and North). Following the above-quoted exchange,
Inouye suggested that the matter be discussed in an executive session, seejasonmacs, infra,
but I have been unable to locate evidence indicating that this session took place.
193. Alfonso Chardy, Reagan Aides and the 'Secret' Government, M Ai HERALD (July 5, 1987),
at 15A.
194. See CNN Special Assignment: Doomsday Government (CNN television broadcast Nov. 17,
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COG plans and PEADs or developed new ones.197 Minutes of a 2004
meeting of the Homeland Security Council Deputies Committee in-
dicate that the Deputies committed to
advise their own Department and Agency general counsels to
work with [the Homeland Security Council's] HSC's Office of
General Counsel and the White House Counsel's Office to:
a. Update those Presidential Emergency Action Documents
(PEADs) assigned to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to
their respective Department or Agency; and
b. Compile or update individual Department and Agency
compilations of Secretarial emergency authorities. 198
Evidence for the persistence of PEADs is also seen in the FEMA
Manual. 199 U.S. military documents indicate that FEMA's National
Preparedness Directorate develops PEADs,2° ° which are currently
retained by FEMA "permanent[ly,]" until "superseded or
obsolete."2
0'
At least some of these plans appear to contemplate executive
usurpation of broad powers and curtailment of individual rights to
the same extent as in the Eisenhower-era plans. National Journal re-
ported in 2011 that current "[c]lassified Executive Orders spell out
a range of powers the president can assume in the event of an inci-
dent of national significance. (Since 1958, one of these documents
has provided for the suspension of habeas corpus for citizens on
'security' lists at the time of a crisis.)" 202 Lengthy investigative arti-
cles have indicated that the federal government, as of the end of
the George W. Bush administration, still maintained a database of
197. See PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, CRITICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS: PROTECTING AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURES B-17 (1997), available at www.fas.org/sgp/
library/pccip.pdf (pertaining to the Clinton Administration); MINUTES, HSC DEPUTIES CoM-
MITrEEE MEETING SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS (May 6, 2004), available at http://library.rums
feld.com/doclib/sp/3135/2004-05-12%20to%20Jim%2Haynes%20re%20Fingerprints%20
Memo%20Attachment.pdf#search="pead" (pertaining to the George W. Bush Administra-
tion); Ambinder, supra note 172 (pertaining to the Obama Administration).
198. MINUTES, supra note 197. These are attached to a memorandum from former Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Jim Haynes, then General Counsel of the Department of
Defense, and former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. See id.
199. FEMA, sup-a note 172, at 111.
200. See U.S. AIR FORCE AIR MOBILITY COMMAND, DIRECTOR OF MOBILITY FORCES (DM4)
HANDBOOK 42 (2011) (on file with author).
201. FEMA, supra note 172, at 111.
202. Ambinder, supra note 172.
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putatively dangerous persons to be detained without charge during
an emergency. 203 The database is apparently known as "Main Core,"
and is reported to contain eight million names.
204
At least one person who was implicated in the development of
PEADs has attested to their continued existence. Colonel Oliver
North, who was reported to have been involved in COG planning in
the 1980s, 205 publicly claimed in 2010 that a PEAD exists "to em-
bargo ... any company that cooperates with an enemy."20 6 He also
claimed in 2005 that "neither [President Bush] nor any other [pres-
ident] needs more 'legal' or legislated authority to send U.S. troops
into the teeth of a disaster. Every President's aides carry PEADs...
giving the Chief Executive broad authorities in the midst of a de-
clared national emergency." 2°7 Bolstering North's claim, the De-
partment of Homeland Security lists among its "target capabilities"
for emergency response the power to "[i]mplement plans for
Emergency proclamations, martial law, curfew declarations, and
other legal issues.
'208
Post-9/11 circumstances, moreover, increase the likelihood that
PEADs will be utilized. COG plans were activated for the first time
in U.S. history after the 9/11 attacks.209 These plans were converted
from a temporary measure to an "indefinite precaution"-a "per-
manent feature of 'the new reality, based on what the threat looks
like,"' with "high-ranking officials representing their departments
. . rotating in and out of the assignment at one of two fortified
203. See Christopher Ketcham, The Last Roundup, 2 RADAR 4, issue 10, 80-88 (May/June
2008), available at http://www.christopherketcham.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2010
%2FO2%2FThe%252OLast%2520Roundup%2C%252ORadar%252OMagazine.pdf; Tim Shor-
rock, Exposing Bush's Historic Abuse of Power, SALON (July 23, 2008, 8:00 AM), http://www.
salon.com/2008/07/23/newchurchcomm/.
204. See Ketcham, supra note 203; Shorrock, supra note 203.
205. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
206. FOX Hannity, (Fox News Network television broadcast Apr. 29, 2010).
207. Oliver North, Send in the Marines, MtLxTARY.COM (Sept. 29, 2005), http://www.
military.com/opinion/O,,77908,00.html. North added, "In May of 1992, President George H.
W. Bush issued such an order at the request of [the] California governor during the 'Rodney
King riots' in Los Angeles. His Executive Order 12804 suspended the proscriptions of Posse
Comitatus to allow Army and Marine units to 'restore law and order.'" Id.
208. See Target Capabilities List: A Companion to the National Preparedness Guidelines, U.S.
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Sept. 2007), https://www.fema.gov/txt/government/training
/tcl.txt (also available at http://web.archive.org/web/20100603040544/https://www.fema.
gov/txt/government/training/tcl.txt).
209. See NAT'L COMMISSION ON TERR RISr ATrAcKs UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 38, 326, 555 n.9 (2004); Barton Gellman & Susan Schmidt, Shadow Government Is at
Work in Secret, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/06/9/AR2006060900891.html.
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locations along the East Coast," reportedly to ensure the continued
functioning of government in the event of a catastrophe.
2 10
The contemporary COG framework, as far as can be determined
from publicly available information, lacks the sharp demarcation
between normal government functioning and emergency COG
functioning via PEADs. Today, activating COG plans does not trig-
ger an abrupt transition to a sharply different federal structure. In-
stead, government functions transition gradually into COG
functioning depending on official perceptions of the probability
and severity of an emergency.211 Federal agencies transfer person-
nel and authority to alternate locations as the Continuity of Govern-
ment Readiness Conditions (COGCON) "readiness level" changes
in response "to escalating threat levels or actual emergencies.
21 2
Because actively functioning parallel governmental structures
meant to trigger PEADs are institutionalized within the normal
structure of government, the threshold for deploying PEADs neces-
sarily becomes lower. Furthermore, as COG functions become
imbricated within non-emergency government procedures, COG
will likely become regarded as a garden-variety feature of the ad-
ministrative state, setting the stage for executive assertion of even
more expansive emergency powers in the future. The normaliza-
tion of COG, in other words, might well function as a one-way
ratchet toward even more expansive executive powers. The result is
an increased likelihood that PEADs will be deployed, and that those
deployed will cause profound, lasting transformations to American
democracy-transformations of questionable legality.
IV. NATIONAL EMERGENCIES, THE MILITARY,
AND THE "GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR"
Presidential declarations of national emergency furnish the Pres-
ident with broad military and foreign affairs powers. This Part fo-
cuses on a small group of those powers, which authorize the
Executive to call reserve troops to service and expand the armed
forces beyond statutorily prescribed limits. These authorities,
though little discussed, are among the primary bases for the
210. Gellman & Schmidt, supra note 209.
211. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURIY, FEDERAL CONTINUITY DIRECrVE 1 n.3 (2008),
available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/offices/fcdl.pdf.
212. Id. at 4. COGCON levels range from one to four, with Level One being the most
urgent. This scheme resembles the Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) system main-
tained by the U.S. Department of Defense. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, EMERGENCY Ac-
TIONS PLAN 4-5 (2001), available at http://www.sas.usace.arny.mil/em/CESAS500112.pdf.
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"Global War on Terror" (GWOT). In short, the GWOT is being
conducted in large part on the basis of emergency decrees. (The
analysis below brackets the interesting question of whether the con-
temporary GWOT actually constitutes an armed conflict under do-
mestic and international law.)
The GWOT transcends the temporal and geographic limits we
traditionally associate with armed conflicts. The Pentagon's Febru-
ary 2013 casualty report for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)-
the military campaign most commonly associated with the "global
war on terror"-includes U.S. military and civilian casualties in six-
teen countries on four continents. 213 In 2012, members of the U.S.
Special Forces were deployed in seventy-nine countries to combat
suspected terrorists, 214 up from sixty in 2009.215 The lack of tempo-
ral and geographic boundaries on how the GWOT is fought is suc-
cinctly expressed in an Executive Order signed by President Bush
to establish "Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary and Service
Medals." 216 The Executive Order specifies that the medals "shall be
awarded to members of the Armed Forces of the United States who
serve or have served in military expeditions to combat terrorism, as
defined by such regulations, on or after September 11, 2001, and
before a terminal date to be prescribed by the Secretary of De-
fense."217 The "war," according to this Order, consists of all
terrorism-related military operations. Its endpoint is not defined by
a concrete military achievement; rather, it will end when the
Executive Branch says it has ended.
Most legal commentators assume that the struggle against al
Qaeda has largely been waged on the basis of the 2001 congres-
sional Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) .218 But an-
other central element of this unbounded so-called war is a similarly
213. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, CASUALTY STATUS REPORT (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.
defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf. The countries are Afghanistan, Cuba (Guantanamo Bay),
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Philippines, Seychelles, Su-
dan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Id.
214. See Pam Benson, Special Operations Forces Risk Being Overused (July 27, 2012), http://
security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/27/special-operations-forces-risk-being-overused-misused-
former-chief-says/.
215. See Karen DeYoung & GregJaffe, U.S. 'Secret War'Expands Globally as Special Operations
Forces Take Larger Role, WASH. POST (June 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/06/03/AR2010060304965.html.
216. See Exec. Order No. 13,289, 3 C.F.R. 191-92 (2004).
217. See id. §§ 1-2.
218. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, Presidential Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52 B.C.
L. REV. 1551-52 (2011) ("In the days following the attacks on September 11, Congress
granted the President authority [in the AUMF]. With this grant of power, President George
W. Bush subsequently undertook a number of actions."); Authorization for Use of Military
Force § 2(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006).
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unbounded national emergency declared by the President.2 9 This
declaration has never been reviewed by Congress and has been re-
newed annually by Presidents Bush and Obama since 2001.220 As
this Part will discuss, Proclamation 7463, declared in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, has served as the primary authorization for the
Executive to call hundreds of thousands of reservists into indefinite
active service, extend the tours of duty of thousands of military per-
sonnel past contractually agreed upon termination dates, and waive
statutory limitations on the size of the armed forces.
221
A. Proclamation 7463 and the Organization of
"Overseas Contingency Operations"
This section is intended to show that various Executive agencies
have understood that the national emergency declared after 9/11
has a crucial role to play in the struggle against al Qaeda. The next
section (Section B) details how the declaration and continuation of
this emergency has enabled the Executive to order Americans to
active duty in the armed forces without a congressional authoriza-
tion for the use of force, and to use a "back-door draft" to expand
the armed forces by unilaterally extending the terms of service of
active-duty personnel beyond their agreed-upon date of
termination.
The terminology the Executive Branch has used over the past
twelve years to describe global combat operations against suspected
terrorists is diverse and evolving. The paradigmatic terms were
219. See Proclamation No. 7463, 3 C.F.R. 263 (2002), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CFR-2002-title3-voll/pdf/CFR-2002-tite3-voll-proc7463.pdf.
220. See H.R. Doc. No. 107-261 (2002); Notice of September 10, 2003, 68 Fed. Reg.
53,665; Notice of September 10, 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 55,313; Notice of September 8, 2005, 70
Fed. Reg. 54,229; Notice of September 5, 2006, 71 Fed. Reg. 52,733; Notice of September 12,
2007, 72 Fed. Reg. 52,465; Notice of August 28, 2008, 73 Fed. Reg. 51,211; Notice of Septem-
ber 10, 2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 46,883; Notice of September 10, 2010, 75 Fed. Reg. 55,661; Notice
of September 9, 2011, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,633, Notice of September 11, 2012, 77 Fed. Reg.
56,517 (all entitled "Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Certain Terror-
ist Attacks"). It is clear that Congress does not review the emergency status because each
renewal by the President is a "continuation." If Congress had reviewed the emergency every
six months, as the plain language of the statute directs, Congress would be the body continu-
ing or discontinuing the emergency, not the President.
221. See infra Part I.B.
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"War on Terror"222 and its variants, including "Global War on Ter-
rorism" 223 (GWOT) and the "Long War."224 Although these designa-
tions still see some use in official circles, 225 and have widespread
popular valence, the Obama Administration has now officially
designated antiterrorism operations abroad as "Overseas Contin-
gency Operations. '226 The shift in terminology belies a crucial con-
tinuity between the two administrations: the state of national
emergency proclaimed by President Bush following the 9/11 at-
tacks227 has been renewed every year to date by both Presidents.
2 8
President George W. Bush issued Proclamation 7463, "Declara-
tion of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist At-
tacks," on September 14, 2001 .229 This Proclamation, which ushered
in a wide-ranging national emergency,230 was made pursuant to the
NEA and listed ten statutory provisions containing standby emer-
gency authorities that the President intended to utilize. 23 1 These
provisions have played, and continue to play, a pivotal role in facili-
tating the conduct of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq.232 This national emergency remains in effect, leaving the Exec-
utive authorities granted by these provisions in effect as well.
233
222. E.g., OFFICE OF MGMrr. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2005 1 (2005) ("America will prevail in the War on
Terror by defeating terrorists and their supporters.").
223. E.g., DAVID S. CHU, DEP'T OF DEFENSE CMLIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SERV., MEM-
ORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS ON SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEDAL
FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM, (2007), available at http://www.cpms.osd.mil/ASSETS/
0A1E43DB055F4565B3B1AC5C9EA9563A/Aug%20Announcement%2OMemo.pdf.
224. E.g., Bill Sullivan, Fighting the Long War-Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism, AIR
UNIV. (Jan. 12, 2006), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cs/cslongwar-12janO6_j5.
pdf.
225. See, e.g., War on Terror Exhibit, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Oct. 14, 2011),
http://www.fbi.gov/news/podcasts/thisweek/war-on-terror-exhibit/view.
226. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012 137-40 (2012); Scott Wilson & A] Kamen,
'Global War on Terror' Is Given New Name, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html. The
Obama Administration has also termed the general effort to combat terrorism domestically
and internationally as "Countering Violent Extremism." See Mark Hosenball, Obama's 'Intelli-
gence Czar' Plugs a New Counterterrorism Catchphrase, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 6, 2010), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/blogs/declassified/2010/04/06/obama-s-intelligence-
czar-plugs-a-new-counterterrorism-catchphrase.html.
227. See infra Part IV.B-C.
228. See supra notes 220-221 and accompanying text.
229. See Proclamation No. 3 C.F.R. 263 (2002).
230. See infra Part IV.B-C.
231. See id.
232. See infra notes 234-254 and accompanying text.
233. See Notice, Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Certain Terror-
ist Attacks, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,633 (Sept. 9, 2011).
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One provision that the Proclamation invoked was 10 U.S.C.
§ 101(a)(13), which defines a "contingency operation."234 A "con-
tingency operation," unlike "War on Terror," has statutory
significance:
The term "contingency operation" means a military operation
that-
(A) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation
in which members of the armed forces are or may become in-
volved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an
enemy of the United States or against an opposing military
force; or
(B) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty
of members of the uniformed services under section 688,
12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12305, or 12406 of this title, chapter
15 of this title, or any other provision of law... during a war
or during a national emergency declared by the President or
Congress.
2 35
The Proclamation, together with an Executive Order made pur-
suant to the Proclamation and issued the same day,236 called mem-
bers of the Ready Reserve to serve under § 12302237 in OEF. The
Proclamation thus satisfied the criteria under subpart (B) for the
existence of a contingency operation. That national emergency
served, and still serves, as the source of authority for calling reserve
components of the military to active duty in OEF,2 3 which com-
prises ongoing U.S. military activities in combating suspected ter-
rorists in Afghanistan and numerous other nations throughout the
world.239 This Proclamation and Executive Order also serve as the
only bases for ordering troops to active duty in the other prominent
U.S. military operations of the past decade: Operation Iraqi Free-
dom (OIF) (the invasion and occupation of Iraq beginning in
March 2003), Operation New Dawn (OND) (the continuing U.S.
234. See Proclamation No. 7463, 3 C.F.R. 263 (2002); 10 U.S.C.A. § 101 (a) (13) (A)-(B)
(West 2012).
235. See id. (emphasis added).
236. See Exec. Order 13,223, 3 C.F.R. 785-86 (2002).
237. 10 U.S.C. § 12302 (2006).
238. See Exec. Order 13,223, 3 C.F.R. 785-86 (2002).
239. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE supra note 213.
WINTER 2013]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [
military mission in Iraq), and Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) (do-
mestic GWOT-related military exercises). 24 The Army has stated:
Operations Noble Eagle (ONE), OEF and OIF fall under one
involuntary callup action, Executive Order 13223, September
14, 2001, better known as the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) contingency/conflict.... ONE, OEF, OIF, and Op-
eration New Dawn (OND) fall under one contingency, the
GWOT.
241
A 2003 memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
to President Bush provides even more telling evidence of the cen-
tral role Proclamation 7463 plays in the War on Terror.242 The
memorandum requests that the President renew the NEA and pro-
vides draft language for the President to effectuate the renewal.
243
Rumsfeld stressed the importance to the continuation of the
GWOT of renewing the national emergency:
On September 14, 2001, you declared a national emergency in
Proclamation 7463. Pursuant to that declaration, you have is-
sued Executive Orders.. . . These Executive Orders have been
essential in our war on terrorism .... Continued access to
members of our Reserve components, use of the military per-
sonnel authorities, and exercise of the emergency construc-
tion authority delegated in the Executive Orders cited above,
will be vital after September 14, 2003, the second anniversary
date of Proclamation 7463.244
High-ranking Executive Branch officials thus have clearly viewed
the state of national emergency declared in 2001 to be central to
the propagation of the War on Terror.
In light of these Proclamations, the vigorous debate over whether
the Iraq War was part of the GWOT seems moot. According to the
240. See Armed Forces Reserve Medal, U.S. ARMY HUMAN RESOURCES COMMAND WEBSITE (last
updated Feb. 28, 2012), https://www.hrc.army.mil/TAGD/Armed%20Forces%2Reserve%
20Medal; see also RichardJ. Lavigne, Title X v. Title IV. A Mobilization Culture, 54 USCG RESERV-
iST 7-01.
241. See Armed Forces Reserve Medal, supra note 240 (explaining why a soldier was only enti-
tled to one "M-Device Reservist Medal" for serving in both OIF and OEF) (emphasis added).
242. See DONALD RUMSFE[.O, MEMORANDUM TO GEORGE W. BUSH ON EXTENSION OF THE
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military, the national emergency declared by President Bush au-
thorized the mobilization of the armed forces for all of the major
conflicts of the last decade. Tellingly, these conflicts all fall under
the single heading, "Overseas Contingency Operation," in the 2013
proposed military budget.245 The federal government's conception
of the GWOT seems unbounded not only in geographic and tem-
poral scope, but also in its capacity to form the legal foundation of
all major U.S. military operations, both domestically and through-
out the world.
B. Involuntary Service in-and Expansion of-the Armed Forces
The traditional narrative offered to explain the legal basis for the
military powers invoked by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack
Obama following the 9/11 terrorist attacks focuses on the AUMF,
passed one week after the horrific events of that day.246 The AUMF
provides " [t] hat the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the ter-
rorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored
such organizations or persons."
2 47
Congress intended the AUMF to satisfy in advance the require-
ments of the War Powers Resolution (WPR) ,24S which requires con-
gressional authorization for the President's mobilization of troops
into hostilities within sixty days after Congress receives notice of
such an event.249 Scholars, congressional representatives, and gov-
ernment officials hold that the AUMF is the source of executive
authority to call up and deploy troops. 250 But significant actions,
245. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OVERSEAS CONTIN-
GENCY OPERATIONS, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 92 (2013), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/overseas.pdf.
246. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, Presidential Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52 B.C.
L. REv. 1551-52 (2011) ("In the days following the attacks on September 11, Congress
granted the President authority [in the AUMF]. With this grant of power, President George
W. Bush subsequently undertook a number of actions."); Authorization for Use of Military
Force § 2(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OFA LETHAL
OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL
QAI'DA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 2 (undated), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/
msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJWhitePaper.pdf (citing the AUMF as one basis of au-
thority for senior administration officials to order the killing of American citizens suspected
of engaging in terrorism).
247. Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006).
248. See id. § 2(b).
249. See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2006).
250. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
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carried on by the Executive Branch without a congressional grant
of authority, preceded the AUMF.
Simply by declaring a national emergency, the Executive Branch
was able to order up to one million Americans to active duty in the
U.S. armed forces. In Proclamation 7463, President Bush declared
that he would use the authorities granted to him under 10 U.S.C.
§ 12302,251 which gives the President authority to call up the Ready
Reserve in a declared national emergency.2 52 The Ready Reserve
consists of approximately 1.08 million people, 53 and "is the primary
manpower pool of the reserve components" of the entire mili-
tary.25 4 Activating executive authorities under § 12302 allowed the
Secretary of Defense or his designee, "without the consent of the
persons concerned," to order any unit or unassigned member to
active duty for up to twenty-four consecutive months.2 55 Although
the statute limits the number of persons in involuntary active-duty
service to one million,256 the number of reservists that may be invol-
untarily called to active duty as a result of the Proclamation amount
to nearly the entire strength of the Ready Reserve.
257
The Proclamation not only permits the involuntary deployment
of reservists, but also involuntary extension of their tours of duty-
a process known as "stop loss" 25 8 or the "back-door draft."259 During
a national emergency, the President may "suspend any provision of
law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to
any active-duty member of the armed forces whom the President
determines is essential to the national security of the United
States."260 Those members of the armed forces must serve in the
military for the full twenty-four months specified in § 12302 or for
another period determined by the President, whichever is earlier.
2 61
251. See Proclamation No. 7463, 3 C.F.R. 263 (2002).
252. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 12302(a)-(c) (West 2012).
253. See LAWRENCE KAPP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30802, RESERVE COMPONENT PERSON-
NEL ISSUES 4 (2012).
254. Id. at 1. The seven components of the military are the Army National Guard, the
Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Air
Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. See id. at 5.
255. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 12302(a) (West 2012).
256. See id. § 12302(c).
257. See KAPP, supra note 253, at 4.
258. See CHARLES A. HEMING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40121, U.S. MILITARY STOP Loss
PROGRAM: KEY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 4 (2009).
259. See, e.g., Cheryce M. Cryer, Stop Loss and the Back-Door Draft: An Illumination of Govern-
ment Contract Violations and Potential Allegations of Modern-Day Slavery, 49 How. L.J. 853, 853
(2006).
260. See 10 U.S.C. § 12305 (2006) (a provision triggered by the national emergency de-
clared after 9/11).
261. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 12305(b) (West 2012).
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The stop-loss policy raises important due process concerns for
service members compelled to serve for months beyond their antici-
pated termination of active duty. 26 2 Stop loss also puts additional
strain on military families and has forced wounded soldiers back
into active duty.2 63 Strikingly, even though the Iraq War is officially
over, "Reserve Component service members may still be ordered to
active duty, with or without their consent, to support Operation
New Dawn for up to 400 days... to provide flexibility for the Com-
batant Commander.
264
V. RESTORING OVERSIGHT OVER DECLARED STATES OF EMERGENCY
A nation under thirty states of national emergency can hardly
claim that emergency laws are the exception to-rather than the
rule of-normal governance. Draft and operational directives that
contemplate drastically curtailing individual freedoms, and appear
not to have benefited from the participation or oversight of the leg-
islative and judicial branches, undermine the conception of
the United States as a nation governed primarily by laws and
regulations passed according to predetermined, open, and
constitutionally based procedures. Furthermore, since the NEA
only provides for a single type of national emergency, each national
emergency declared, whether about an issue of great or compara-
tively small importance to the survival of the nation, puts every avail-
able national emergency power at the disposal of the Executive,
regardless of whether the powers are necessary to combat the de-
clared emergency. In other words, the national emergency declared
in response to the 9/11 attacks has the same legal effect as the na-
tional emergency declared relative to "persons undermining demo-
cratic processes or institutions in Zimbabwe": each allows the
Executive to empoy any powers that the U.S. Code or Executive
Orders authorize for use in a national emergency.
262. See, e.g., Evan Woo ton, Banging on the Back-Door Drafl: The Constitutional Validity of Stop-
Loss in the Military, 47 Wm. & MARY L. RaV. 1061 passim (2005).
263. See George Maynard, Troops' Suffering Compounded By Stop-Loss, THE DAILY CAMPUS
(last updated Jan. 18, 2010), http://www.dailycampus.com/2.7438/troops-suffering-
compounded-by-stop-loss-1.1055580#.UBKhHqCbrKQ.
264. CLIFFORD M. STANLEY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MEMORANDUM TO SECRETARIES
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Remedying this situation will require sustained efforts on several
fronts, including the involvement of informed and passionately en-
gaged U.S. residents. Three reforms are essential: revising the Na-
tional Emergencies Act to provide for meaningful congressional
oversight; ensuring congressional review of Presidential Emergency
Action Documents; and establishing a bipartisan select committee
to assess the scope of emergency powers available to the Executive
today and to promote public dialogue. This Part addresses each of
these proposals in turn.
A. Revisions to 50 U.S.C. § 1621
The following proposed revisions to the National Emergencies
Act will accomplish three key objectives: force congressional review
of declarations of national emergency through a funding mecha-
nism; prevent the President from declaring an emergency
substantially similar to one deactivated by Congress; and provide
that no funds should be expended pursuant to presidential direc-
tives (including PEADs) that are not disclosed to Congress. These
revisions will also help fulfill the intent of the Special Committee
that drafted the legislation and the Congress that overwhelmingly
approved it.
1. Revised Statute
Proposed revisions to the NEA are contained in the text below. I
have tried to preserve the original statutory language where possi-
ble. Additions to the statute are underlined, and deleted portions
are indicated by strike-though text.
(a) Wth respet to Act.S of Congress authoizing the ex.er.ise, dur
ing the period of a national emerFgey, of any speeial or eyaraordi
nary pewer, the President is authorized to declare such national
emergency'. Sursh prcaatoRhall iAmdialy be transm~itted to
the Congress and published in the Federal Register. Any declara-
tion of national emergency by the president, whether pursuant to
an Act of Congress or a presidential directive, shall be immediately
transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.
(b) Any provisions of law conferring powers and authorities to be
exercised during a national emergency shall be effective and re-
main in effect-
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(1) only when the President or his designee (in accordance with
subsection (a) of this section), specifically declares a national emer-
gency, and
(2) only in accordance with this chapter. No law enacted after
September 14, 1976, shall supersede this subchapter unless it does
so in specific terms, referring to this subchapter, and declaring that
the new law supersedes the provisions of this subchapter.
(c) For purposes of this subchapter and any powers exercised pur-
suant to this subchapter-
(1) "national emergency" includes any emergency declared by
the President, however denominated, except an emergency
declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, as amended.
(2) "presidential directives" include presidential determinations,
memoranda, letters, notices, military orders, homeland se-
curity directives, emergency action documents, national con-
tinuity directives, executive orders, proclamations, and any
similar documents that assert powers pursuant to a state of
emergency.
2. Discussion
The proposed revised statute expands the definition of "national
emergency" to comprise all relevant states of emergency contained
in the U.S. Code. This change reflects the intent of the Senate Spe-
cial Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency.
265
The revision also extends the regulatory authority of the National
Emergencies Act to emergency powers contained in presidential di-
rectives. 266 Federal disaster relief to states and local communities
under the Stafford Act 267 is exempt from the revised statute.
268
Some might argue that exempting the Stafford Act offers a loop-
hole for indefinite emergency powers. The Stafford Act, however,
has a restrictive definition of "emergency" that does not invoke the
265. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60; § 1 of revised statute.
266. See § 2 of revised statute.
267. See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L.
93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207). As an example, this
Act was recently employed to provide disaster relief in numerous states following Hurricane
Sandy. See, e.g., Hurricane Sandy: Stafford Act Emergency Declarations for 11 States, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR EMPLOYEE & TRAINING ADMIN., http://www.doleta.gov/usworkforce/whatsnew/eta-
default.cfm?id=5860 (last updated Oct. 31, 2012).
268. See § 1 of revised statute.
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more expansive powers previously described.269 Federal action au-
thorized under that Act is intended merely to supplement the ef-
forts of state and local governments. 270 Obtaining congressional
approval for federal assistance for every localized disaster might
prove cumbersome, and emergencies declared under the Stafford
Act have not led to indefinite assertions of broad presidential
power.271 Asserting such power on a national level on the basis of a
localized natural disaster, moreover, might lack political legitimacy.
Others might argue that a congressional vote to terminate a na-
tional emergency will endanger U.S. treaty obligations. The United
Nations Charter obligates U.N. member states to give effect-
through such means as "complete or partial interruption of eco-
nomic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations"-to economic sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security
Council.2 72 Presidents appear to have sometimes declared national
emergencies in part to implement sanctions imposed by the Secur-
ity Council.
273
The United Nations Participation Act (UNPA), however, appears
to provide sufficient authority to implement economic sanctions
imposed by the U.N. Security Council under Article 41 of the U.N.
Charter 274-a fact that has been recognized by the U.S. Treasury
269. The NEA requires that the exercise of emergency powers is authorized during a
national emergency "only when the President... specifically declares a national emergency,
and (2) only in accordance with this chapter." 50 U.S.C. § 1621(b) (2006). The NEA further
provides, "No law enacted after September 14, 1976, shall supersede this subchapter unless it
does so in specific terms, referring to this subchapter, and declaring that the new law super-
sedes the provisions of this subchapter." Id. Nothing in the Stafford Act matches the descrip-
tion of this latter provision.
270. An emergency under the Stafford Act "means any occasion or instance for which, in
the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and
local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and
safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States." 42
U.S.C.A. § 5122 (2006).
271. No national emergency has ever been declared under the Stafford Act. See supra Part
Ill, Table 1.
272. See U.N. Charter arts. 25, 41.
273. See Exec. Order No. 13,396, 3 C.F.R. 209-10 (2007) (implementing a 2004 Security
Council resolution that imposed sanctions on Cte d'Ivoire); Exec. Order No. 12,725, 55
Fed. Reg. 33,091 (Aug. 9, 1990) (implementing Security Council sanctions on Iraq following
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait).
274. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 287c(a) (West 2012) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of any other
law, whenever the United States is called upon by the Security Council to apply measures
which said Council has decided, pursuant to article 41 of said Charter, are to be employed to
give effect to its decisions under said Charter, the President may, to the extent necessary to
apply such measures, through any agency which he may designate, and under such orders,
rules, and regulations as may be prescribed by him, investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in
whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other
means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or any person
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Department. 275 This includes the ability of the President to block
access to property pursuant to a resolution of the Security Coun-
cil.2 76 Provisions of the UNPA do not require a declaration of
national emergency in order to become effective. 27 Executive de-
partments also sometimes implement Security Council resolutions
without prior presidential action.278 In short, the Executive has suf-
ficient means at its disposal to impose Security Council sanctions
without activating sweeping emergency powers by declaring a na-
tional emergency.
2 79
B. Revisions to 50 U.S.C. § 1622
1. Revised Statute
(a) TERMINATION METHODS
Any national emergency declared by the President in accordance
with this subchapter, and any national emergency the President or
officials in the Executive Branch assert is otherwise in force, shall
terminate if-
(1) there is enacted into law a joint resolution terminating the
emergency; or
therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving
any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.").
275. See Willam B. Hoffman, Chief Counsel, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep't
of the Treasury, How to Approach a New Office of Foreign Assets Control Sanctions Program, 27
STETSON L. Riv. 1413 (1998) ("UNPA provides domestic implementation authority for
mandatory provisions of U.N. Security Council resolutions under chapter 41 of the United
Nations Charter.").
276. See id.
277. See 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 287-287c(a) (West 2012).
278. See Embargoed Persons and Countries, U.S. BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SECURrIY, http://
www.bis.doc.gov/policiesandregulations/05forpolcontrols/chap5_embargo.htm (last visited
Feb. 12, 2013) (noting that the day after a 2004 Security Council embargo on arms exports to
C6te d'Ivoire, the U.S. Department of State issued guidance to arms manufacturers stating
that it would not approve licenses for exports of defense articles to C6te d'Ivoire). The na-
tional emergency regarding C6te d'Ivoire was not declared until 2006. See Exec. Order No.
13,396, 3 C.F.R. 209-10 (2007).
279. Even if the IEEPA were necessary to implement a Security Council resolution, the
NEA's requirement that Congress vote every six months on whether to terminate a national
emergency is lawful and should take precedence over any contrary provision in the U.N.
Charter. Under traditional U.S. principles of statutory construction, a duly enacted federal
statute trumps contrary provisions of an earlier treaty. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 464 F.3d 1, 12 (2006). The U.N. Charter was signed in
1945. See Introductory Note, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
intro.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2013). This means that congressional votes to terminate a
national emergency according to the 1976 NEA or any future reformed version of the statute
would be lawful.
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(2) the President issues a proclamation terminating the emer-
gency; or
(3) Congress does not enact a joint resolution to continue the
emergency within 60 days following a declaration of national emer-
gency, or Congress does not enact a joint resolution to continue the
emergency within 60 days of the most recent joint resolution con-
tinuing the emergency, whichever is later.
Any national emergency declared by the President shall be termi-
nated on the date specified in any joint resolution referred to in
clause (1); or-on the date specified in a proclamation by the Presi-
dent terminating the emergency as provided in clause (2) of this
subsection; or on the date specified in clause (3) of this subsection,
whichever date is earlier. Any powers or authorities exercised by
reason of said emergency shall cease to be exercised after such
specified date, except that such termination shall not affect-
(A) any action taken or proceeding pending not finally con-
cluded or determined on such date;
(B) any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior
to such date; or
(C) any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were in-
curred prior to such date.
(b) TRITINREWIEW or NATIONAL EMERGENCIES B* CONGR:ESS
-Not later than siy. months after a national emerenI is declared,
and not later than the end of each six month period thereafter that
such4 emergency continues, eaeh House of Congre@ss shall meot to
c..nSidef a vote On a joint resolution to deermine.h.ether tha
emergent/ shall be terminated.
(b) EXPENDITURES
No funds may be appropriated or expended pursuant to a national
emergency that has been terminated, except as provided in clause
(3) of subsection (a) of this section.
(c) EFFECTIVENESS OF TERMINATION
The President may not declare, and no funds may be expended
pursuant to, an emergency that is based on a substantially similar
core of operative fact as a terminated emergency within six months
of the emergency's termination.
2. Discussion
These revisions require Congress to pass a joint resolution every
sixty days to continue a national emergency. 280 This prevents the
280. See 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (3) of revised statute.
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continuation of indefinite emergencies. Some might view this pe-
riod of review as too short, particularly in light of the six-month
period of review the statute previously specified. Minor modifica-
tions to this time period would probably not impair the statute's
effectiveness in accomplishing the objectives of these proposed revi-
sions. Regardless, however, the sweeping nature of the emergency
powers currently authorized by statute call for more frequent con-
gressional review to protect against abuse and executive overreach.
The revisions specify that a national emergency terminates if
Congress fails to pass a joint resolution continuing it, in which case
all emergency authorities that were exercised pursuant to the na-
tional emergency cease. 281 The revised statute bans expenditures
pursuant to terminated national emergencies.2 82 The President is
also barred from redeclaring an emergency that Congress termi-
nated, and funds may not be appropriated or expended pursuant
to such an emergency.
2 83
Using funding as a mechanism of congressional oversight corre-
sponds to Congress's traditional constitutional role of possessing
the power of the purse. The requirement that no funds be ex-
pended pursuant to a national emergency that has lapsed or been
terminated also widens the circle of people responsible for ensur-
ing compliance with the law to include numerous administrative
agency personnel, not simply those in Congress and the Executive
Office of the President. This will likely have the effect of placing
additional roadblocks in the way of an overly acquiescent Congress
and a President who seeks to use emergency powers in legally ques-
tionable ways.
C. Promoting Additional Congressional Oversight and Public Dialogue
To ensure proper oversight and begin a public dialogue about
the authorities the Executive Branch should be able to exercise in a
national emergency, Congress should convene a special bipartisan
committee similar to the Senate Special Committee on the Termi-
nation of the National Emergency. This committee could promote
awareness and discussion of emergency powers within Congress and
the general public. The extent of Congress's awareness of the vast
array of executive emergency powers is uncertain, as is the extent of
Congress's understanding of Executive Branch COG planning. At
281. See id.
282. See 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b) of revised statute.
283. See 50 U.S.C. § 1622(c) of revised statute.
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least one source suggests that the Executive Branch has sought to
plan collaboratively with Congress and the judiciary.2 4 In 2007,
however, the Executive Branch denied the House Homeland Secur-
ity Committee access to COG plans.285 The White House claimed, in
effect, that the members of the Committee lacked the proper secur-
ity clearances to examine the plans and that the White House
would only share information concerning COG only with the high-
est-ranking members of Congress.2 86 But its willingness to engage in
even that limited degree of information sharing is uncertain. The
Administration did not inform the Senate Majority Leader or the
Senate President Pro Tempore-who is third in the line of presi-
dential succession-that it had implemented COG procedures on
9/11 and kept them in place.
2 87
A special House or Senate bipartisan committee should review
and assess the legality of the PEADs currently on file with the Exec-
utive Branch. PEADs should also be made available to the public
insofar as they do not reveal alternate operational locations, techni-
cal details, or similar information that, if disclosed, would materially
undermine COG operations. This would facilitate meaningful pub-
lic discourse about which restrictions of liberty, if any, should be
imposed during a national emergency and about what circum-
stances constitute a genuine emergency. Discourse of this kind is at
the core of a democratic government, and decisions concerning
fundamental freedoms that are made in the context of full and
open discussion, rather than in secrecy or in the midst of catastro-
phe and panic, are likely to be far more wise and beneficial to the
long-term survival of American democracy.
There is precedent for the type of review proposed here. The
Bush administration briefed some members of the 9/11 Commis-
sion on the "general nature and implementation of... continuity
plans," although the Committee "did not investigate this topic, ex-
cept as necessary to understand the activities and communications
284. See Ambinder, supra note 172 ("The Bush-era COG plans were based on the com-
monsense premise that no post-disaster government would be legitimate unless people per-
ceived it to be a valid expression of their will and the constitutional balancing of powers
among the branches. The Bush White House encouraged the federal branches to plan
together.").
285. See Jeff Kosseff, White House Again Denies DeFazio s Information Request, OREGONLIVE.
cOM (Aug. 2, 2007, 5:31 PM), http://blog.oregonlive.com/politics/2007/08/
white-house again deniesdefaz.html.
286. See id.
287. See, e.g., Francie Grace, 'Shadow Government' News to Congress, CBS NEws (Mar. 1,
2002), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/03/01/attack/main502530.shtml. The web-
site erroneously lists the date of the story as Feb. 11, 2009.
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of key officials on 9/11. '"288 In the 1970s, the Senate Special Com-
mittee began an inquiry into COG programs.2 89 The inquiry, how-
ever, was obstructed by "the veil of secrecy surrounding these
programs."290 At least some members of the most democratic
branch of government should be able to review the plans that the
Executive Branch intends to carry out during a declared emer-
gency, particularly since there is reason to suspect that some of the
plans would propose unlawful acts.
CONCLUSION
The challenge of containing and regulating national emergen-
cies shows itself most clearly in the context of terrorism and foreign
affairs. Every emergency declared since the passage of the NEA was
a response to possible terrorist threats or events that appeared to
implicate U.S. foreign policy.291 But this challenge expands far be-
yond the context of terrorism and international relations.
Emergencies occur everywhere in America and in the world.
Emergency managers operate municipal governments,2 92 the na-
tion faces emergency drug shortages, 293 there are looming scarcities
in fossil fuels and potable water,2 94 and climate change is projected
to have numerous severe consequences that threaten U.S. national
security with droughts, pandemics, floods, starvation, mass migra-
tions, and civil unrest.2 95 The power that the U.S. government
claims it possesses to kill American citizens whom an Executive
Branch official suspects of being members of al Qaeda or associated
forces also reflects an approach to governance that is profoundly
288. See NAT'L COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 209, at 555
n.9.
289. See S. SPECIAL COMM. ON NAT'L EMERGENCIES AND DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS,
STAFF REPORT ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IN THE UNITED STATES, at 38 (1976), reprinted in S.
COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, supra note 8, at 55, 67.
290. Id.
291. See supra Part III, Table 1.
292. See, e.g., Welcome to the Emergency Manager's Page, THE CITY OF PONTIAC, MICHIGAN (last
visited Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.pontiac.mi.us/info/efm.html.
293. Alex Wayne, Doctors' Lobby Declares Drug Shortages a National Emergency, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-15/doctors-lobby-declares-drug-
shortages-national-health-emergency.html.
294. See generally JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, THE LONG EMERGENCY (2005) (projecting ad-
verse political and social consequences of fossil-fuel depletion).
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emergency based. 296 In short, present and anticipated national and
global developments provide ample grist for the mill of expansive
emergency powers. This makes the task of reforming America's
emergency law regime to create effective, rational constraints on
the exercise of emergency powers even more pressing. Without
such constraints, the federal government and the public may be-
come inured to prolonged states of emergency and the expansive
powers they authorize, creating a one-way ratchet toward even more
expansive executive power and establishing a floor for future asser-
tions of emergency authority that may grow more deferential to the
Executive with time.
Furthermore, declaring a national emergency to deal with na-
tional and international threats may prove an all-too-tempting alter-
native to traditional lawmaking, satisfying the Executive's need for
speed and flexibility and limiting the political exposure of members
of Congress. Such an outcome would bode poorly for a sound, de-
liberative legislative process. Emergency decrees made in relative
haste seem inherently less likely than traditional lawmaking to
address a challenge comprehensively and to accommodate the
interests of the people whom a law will likely affect.
The continuing existence of expansive, longstanding national
emergencies without congressional review might also prevent emer-
gency powers from being used with political legitimacy in situations
where they might truly be needed. If political repression and public
corruption by the government of Belarus presently constitute an
"unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and for-
eign policy of the United States,"' 29 7 the word "emergency" ceases to
be meaningful. This could have the effect of making the public cyn-
ical toward claims by the government that emergency powers are
needed to deal with a crisis, hampering effective action.
Legislative reform, effective congressional oversight, trans-
parency, and public involvement can curb the numerous, seemingly
unlimited current states of national emergency. Only wise, demo-
cratic restraints can prevent the United States' present emergency
296. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 246, at 1, 7. Note that the federal government's
current National Strategy for Counterterrorism focuses on "the collection of groups and indi-
viduals who comprise al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents"; "adherents" need not have had
any contact with al Qa'ida, but only need be "inspired to take action in furtherance of the
goals of al-Qa'ida -the organization and the ideology." See ExEc. OFFIcE OF THE PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORiSM 3-4 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism strategy.pdf (emphasis in original) ("Adherence to
al-Qa'ida's ideology may not require allegiance to al-Qa'ida, the organization. Individuals
who sympathize with or actively support al-Qa'ida may be inspired to violence and can pose
an ongoing threat, even if they have little or no formal contact with al-Qa'ida.").
297. Exec. Order No. 13,405, 3 C.F.R. 231-33 (2007).
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law regime from utterly engulfing individual freedoms and civil so-
ciety through ever more aggressive expansions of executive emer-
gency powers.
